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Executive Summary
This report analyses whether entry of UK enterprises into patenting in a technology area is 
affected by patent thickets in the technology area. The aim is to contribute to our understanding 
of the role of patent thickets as a barrier to entry into new technologies for UK enterprises, in 
particular small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The report consists of several parts: 1) a 
review of the literature on patent thickets, including the limited empirical evidence regarding 
effects of patent thickets on R&D investments and competition; 2) discussion of the factors 
contributing to thicket formation and growth; 3) an empirical evaluation of the extent to which 
patent thickets appear to be barriers to entry in some technology areas. 
In our comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on patent thickets of the 
last 15 years, we find overwhelming evidence that patent thickets arise in specific technology 
areas. This literature consists of surveys of firm representatives as well as of econometric 
analyses of firm level data. The literature on thickets contains more than 100 peer reviewed 
papers and a number of extensive studies undertaken by competition regulators. Although the 
literature is not always in complete agreement, a very large majority of the researchers agree 
with this conclusion.
The factors identified as leading to the growth of patent thickets are the following: 1) changes in 
enforcement of patent rights in the US during the 1980s; 2) cumulativeness of innovation and 
the increasing complexity of technology; 3) shifts in technological opportunity in some areas; 4) 
strategic patenting by large corporations and the rise of Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs); 5) lack 
of resources and misaligned incentives in patent offices faced with a flood of patent applications; 
6) growth in trade of high technology products, leading to an increase in the demand for patents 
worldwide. 
The main novel contribution in this study consists of an empirical analysis of the effects of patent 
thickets at the European Patent Office on entry into patenting by UK firms. Using a new measure 
of patent thickets developed by Graevenitz et al. (2012), the report provides a descriptive 
analysis of the growth of patent thickets in the European patent system and an analysis of the 
exposure to these thickets of UK entrants into patenting. Econometric analysis of the probability 
of entry into patenting by technology area shows that the density of a patent thicket in a 
particular technology area is associated with reduced entry into patenting in that area by UK 
firms. Given the importance of holding patents in such areas, we interpret this result as indicating 
reluctance to enter technological areas with patent thickets.
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1 Introduction
This study investigates a question posed by the UK Intellectual Property Office concerning 
patent policy and SMEs:
Are patent thickets a barrier to entry and how do they affect small and medium sized 
enterprises (SMEs)? 
In this introduction we briefly discuss the definition of key terms in these questions, namely 
“patent thickets” and “barriers to entry”. Then we discuss why the question arises now and the 
reasons that answers matter for policymakers. Finally, we present the structure of this study and 
provide a brief summary of our main results.
1.1 Patent thickets
A patent thicket is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must 
hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 2000). Patent 
thickets consist of patents that protect components of a modular and complex technology. 
Here modular means that different sets of components can be assembled to yield a variety of 
technological products. Complex means that products consist of tens or hundreds of such 
modular components. Each component may be used in several products. Often there are partial 
or complete overlaps in the functionality of components and then the patents protecting the 
components may also overlap. If overlapping patents belong to different firms, then a patent 
thicket exists.
Although technology areas with large number of patents often lead to patent thickets, this is not 
necessarily the case. In principle, an active technology area could have a large number of 
patents, each clearly delineating the invention concerned and none with overlapping claims or 
claims with uncertain breadth or scope. Thus it is important not to use numbers of patents as 
an indicator of patent thickets. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly the case that one of implications 
of the presence of patent thickets is active patenting in the sector, so the two phenomena are 
correlated. Later in this report, we propose a measure of thickets in a technology area that 
incorporates an indicator of complexity and the possibility of overlapping claims, and controls 
for the overall level of patenting in the area. 
Patent thickets have been a concern of antitrust agencies and regulators in the United States 
for over ten years (Federal Trade Commission, 2003; U.S. Department of Justice and Federal 
Trade Commission, 2007; Federal Trade Commission, 2011). In Europe interest in the 
phenomenon picked up with some delay (Arundel and Patel, 2003; Harhoff, 2006; Harhoff et 
al., 2007), although it has taken a back seat to reforms of the European patent system such as 
the unified patent court. One reason for reduced interest in Europe is the exclusion of software 
per se as patentable subject matter at the EPO. In the U.S., many of the problems in this area 
are associated with software and internet-related patents.
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While there is a large and growing academic literature on patent thickets (which we survey 
below) much remains to be learned about the origins and especially the effects of patent 
thickets. One important question, which is addressed in this study, is the effect of patent thickets 
on the ability of small and medium sized enterprises to use the patent system in order to protect 
their inventions or to enter markets with complex products. There is little work on this question 
to date.1 This is because patent thickets are a complex phenomenon and the existing literature 
has focused on determining the factors that contribute to this phenomenon and the empirical 
measurement of thickets, and much less on their economic impact. 
Next, we briefly review the factors that contribute to the growth of patent thickets and the 
challenge of evaluating the economic effects of patent thickets. Some of these factors are 
specific to the United States, where patent thickets were first identified in the patent system. 
However, the importance of the US economy, especially as a market for high-technology firms 
from around the globe, has meant that patenting strategies of corporations from outside the 
United States have adapted to strategies used initially by US corporations. Where factors 
contributing to changing patenting behavior are specific to the United States, we point this out 
below and in the literature review. Whenever possible, we specifically discuss empirical evidence 
available on the UK.
The current economic and legal literature has identified the following factors as contributing to 
the growth of patent thickets:
1. The strengthening of patent rights with the creation of the CAFC in the United States in 
1984, the broadening of patentable subject matter and an increased tendency to resolve 
patent disputes using injunctions in some jurisdictions;
2. The cumulative nature of science and by extension of technology and as a result a shift 
towards complexity in many technologies;
3. Shifts in the degree of technological opportunity in various key technologies;
4. Strategic patenting by corporations and the assertion of patents by Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAEs);
5. Lack of resources and misaligned incentives at patent offices dealing with a flood of 
patent applications that resulted from the aforementioned factors;
6. Growth in trade of high technology products, leading to an increase in demand for 
patents by foreign firms and to the spread of patenting trends from Japan and the United 
States to other jurisdictions.
These factors have independent origins; nonetheless they interact to strengthen incentives for 
firms in some sectors to acquire as many patents as possible. For instance, incentives at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) appear to have made it cheaper in some complex technologies 
to acquire additional patents, than to oppose a rival’s weak patent that might be used to limit 
1 The recent report by the FTC (2011) specifically considers the role of small and medium sized enterprises in the 
market for technology in Chapter 1.
A Study of Patent Thickets 9
the use of a specific technology.2 These additional patents could be used to bargain with the 
rival and can be applied for much more quickly than an opposition process could be brought to 
a definitive conclusion. Another example is documented by Hegde et al. (2009) who analyze 
continuations at the USPTO. 3 They cite Robert Barr, former patent counsel for Cisco Inc., who 
states that continuation applications are used by telecommunications firms to separate weak 
claims that are initially rejected by patent examiners from strong claims. The weaker claims are 
then pursued in separate patent applications, the continuation applications. The empirical 
analysis of different types of continuations in Hegde et al. (2009) lends support to this claim.
Incentives to patent extensively create a number of feedback loops – in other words the effects 
of growth in patent applications feed back to the factors that created incentives for patenting 
and strengthen these even more: 
Patent offices have found it hard to obtain resources necessary for careful delineation of patents 
in a period in which larger patent counts were regarded as essential to obtaining freedom to 
operate via the negotiation of cross licenses. This meant patents were sometimes incompletely 
examined, which facilitated the emergence of thickets. Firms intensified their patenting efforts 
as they understood both the weakness of the patent offices and the growing strength of rivals 
acquired by means of their growing patent portfolios. Microsoft and Google provide recent 
examples of this phenomenon.
The quality of patents issued by the USPTO is the focus of the first reports by the FTC and the 
Department of Justice (Federal Trade Commission, 2003; U.S. Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, 2007). The most recent report by these agencies (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2011) focuses in part on the issue of notice – the clarity with which claims in a 
patent are delineated. As the report shows, funding for USPTO and quality of patents granted 
there remains an important concern.
The very large increases in patent applications have led to increasing backlogs of patent 
applications and long delays in the examination and issuing of patent applications. This in turn 
allows applicants to exploit uncertainty surrounding their (possibly) overly broad patent 
applications (Harhoff, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2007; Federal Trade Commission, 2011). The growing 
awareness of this opportunity on the part of firms creates incentives for firms to file broad claims 
that create more uncertainty for rival applicants. 
At least in the United States, the Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit, which had been 
created in 1982 as one of several changes intended to strengthen the incentives to innovate, 
has handed out injunctions frequently against firms deemed to be infringing or potentially 
infringing in some jurisdictions. This forced and forces firms to patent and/or to acquire patent 
portfolios in order to be able to threaten would-be litigators with counter-suits or achieve early 
settlements. It has also created an environment in which firms specialized in the acquisition and 
2 This statement is based on direct communication with the former head of the patent division of a leading UK high 
technology manufacturer.
3 “Continuation applications permit firms to restart the examination of their patent applications while retaining the 
filing date of a previous application that discloses the same invention. Inventors can use continuations to revise 
the claims submitted in their initial application or to pursue claims that have been disallowed after initial 
examination with new arguments and evidence,“ from Hegde et al. (2009), p. 1214.
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legal enforcement of patents flourished because of the profitability of a hold-up strategy even if 
a patent was of dubious validity (Reitzig et al., 2007; Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). So-called Non-
Producing Entities (NPE) or Patent Assertion Entities (PAE), sometimes referred to as “trolls”, 
have been shown to exploit this possibility for hold-up. There is also evidence of increasing 
litigiousness in specific technology areas which is generally attributed to the activity of PAEs 
(Berneman et al., 2009; Lerner, 2010; Federal Trade Commission, 2011). The available evidence 
suggests that litigation by PAEs may result in a net welfare loss and stifle innovation (Bessen et 
al., 2011; Tucker, 2011). The issue of remedies and injunctions has been the focus of the most 
recent report by the Federal Trade Commission (2011). 
Although most of these changes began in the United States, they have had knock-on effects on 
patenting systems in the rest of the world, first in Japan, and then Europe and other East Asian 
countries. 
A side effect of high levels of patenting may be to raise the cost of entry into affected technology 
areas, excluding some new entrants. To put it another way, in a world of cumulative innovation 
where one product depends on hundreds of inventions owned by a large number of firms, there 
is good reason to think that the patent system may discourage innovation overall rather than 
encouraging it, even as it may encourage innovation by a few large firms (Bessen and Maskin, 
2007). 
This could happen because large numbers of patents are generated in the course of strategic 
patenting by large firms. These patent portfolios may create a sunk cost of entry that especially 
smaller firms would find hard to overcome. This is problematic if the portfolios consist of large 
numbers of patents that would not survive if challenged in court. The cost of entry consists of 
the cost of creating a patent portfolio that is sufficiently large to constitute a bargaining chip in 
negotiations over cross licensing, standards, patent pools, or in court proceedings (Grindley 
and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). This cost is generally sunk because 
the majority of such patents are marginal – they do not in fact protect a technology that would 
find a buyer in a market for technology.4 In addition, there is some evidence that patent offices 
flooded with patent filings by firms building large portfolios are unable to devote sufficient time 
to prior art search and therefore may issue patents of low quality in the sense that the invention 
does not satisfy statutory patentability requirements, in particular novelty and the inventive step 
(Shapiro, 2000; Bessen and Maskin, 2007).
This report shows empirically that patent thickets have effects on entry into patenting in specific 
technology areas. The implications of this result depend on the reliability of the data used. We 
discuss limitations in this regard and suggest which additional work might be undertaken to test 
our findings. 
We also seek to establish the economic significance of the effects we identify, but this is much 
harder to do than the empirical analysis we present. It requires that we weigh the costs we can 
measure against potential benefits (due to innovation incentives) that may be associated with 
some of the six factors we have identified as causes of patent thickets above.
4 Recently a few well-publicised purchases of patent portfolios have suggested that such patents may be valuable 
at resale for defensive purposes, that is, for augmenting the portfolios of other large firms. 
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Patent thickets also create substantial transactions costs for the large incumbents caught up in 
the thickets (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Federal Trade Commission, 2003; Somaya, 2003). These 
costs are not the focus of our analysis in this study, because they do not affect entry directly. 
Nonetheless, one might surmise that such costs affect the decision to continue operating in a 
specific technology. If the transactions costs associated with thickets make it difficult for SMEs 
to survive in the marketplace, then patent thickets affect existing SMEs, even if they do not 
represent a barrier to entry. This effect of patent thickets on SMEs is not addressed in this study, 
but will be pursued in future research.
It should be noted that if there are patent thickets in certain industries, those industries are 
necessarily innovative. As we show below, economists studying these industries provide 
evidence that thickets exists and that they increase transactions costs for the majority of firms 
active in these industries. This does not mean that the industries affected are no longer 
innovative, but it does mean that costs of doing business in these industries are higher than 
might be necessary to ensure continual innovation and in some cases prohibitively so. The 
literature also shows that some businesses benefit from higher barriers to entry in these 
industries and others benefit from new business models arising from patent thickets in these 
industries. 
1.2 Barriers to entry
While the term “barriers to entry” has a clearly accessible meaning in normal English, this term 
also has a specific technical meaning in antitrust economics. We use the term in the latter sense 
in this study. This section provides a brief review of the economics literature on the definition of 
the term in the antitrust sense.
Competition is widely seen as a positive force in market economies that provides incentives for 
efficient use of resources and incentives for innovation and finally creates pressures for the exit 
of inefficient firms (Vickers, 1995, inter alia). The benefits of competition are strongly reduced if 
new competitors find it very difficult to enter into competition with existing firms. Entry into 
markets with existing incumbents often requires the entrant to make investments that cannot be 
recovered on exit – these investments are termed sunk costs. Sunk costs arise in many guises; 
the most common are due to building brand recognition or investing in firm-specific capital such 
as technology or knowledge for innovation. Recent work in economics (Sutton, 2007) identifies 
these sunk costs as the result of activities (product differentiation or innovation) on the part of 
incumbents seeking to escape the pressures of competition. Desirable though some of this 
activity may be, sunk costs will also reduce entry and competition, as entrants will need to be 
able to recoup the costs of overcoming the advantages that incumbents derive from their brands 
or technological expertise.
12 A Study of Patent Thickets
Economists studying industrial organization have found that sunk costs arising from investments 
in R&D and to some extent in advertising or distribution facilities increase social welfare,5 i.e. on 
balance these investments create benefits to consumers that outweigh the costs of reduced 
competition to the same consumers. However, there are also cases in which firms raise sunk 
costs and thereby reduce competition to such an extent, that the sunk costs no longer benefit 
consumers. 
Economists refer to those (sunk) costs that protect incumbents against competitive entry and 
allow them to earn more rents than are necessary to incentivize socially beneficial investments 
such as innovation or product differentiation as barriers to entry. Sunk costs are therefore not 
barriers to entry per se, and often it will be the level of sunk costs that creates the problem and 
not the fact that sunk costs arise. As Schmalensee (2004) notes, a cost constitutes a barrier to 
entry, if it limits competition in such a way that welfare is reduced. Different definitions of barriers 
to entry exist in the literature (McAfee et al., 2004) and which definition is appropriate can 
depend on the welfare standard (e.g. total surplus, consumers’ surplus) adopted in a particular 
jurisdiction (Schmalensee, 2004). 
A patent is the right to exclude others from practicing an invention. Therefore, in principle a 
patent will function to increase fixed (and most likely sunk) costs of entry into a market where 
the invention protected by the patent is practiced. This will reduce entry and therefore 
competition. From a welfare perspective, this is the price society pays in order to encourage 
invention and innovation by the initial entrant. What results is a trade-off between the interests 
of the incumbent holding the patent and the potential entrant excluded by it, with a knock-on 
effect on consumers who face higher prices as a result of the temporary monopoly. In the case 
of patents, policy makers need to come to a view of how much protection to afford the patentee 
in order to create incentives for R&D.
To provide an example, individual patents might be considered a barrier to entry, if they protected 
the technological advantage of the patentee for a very long time. The patent term is set so as to 
provide the patentee with a period in which the sunk costs of invention may be recouped. If the 
term were extended beyond this period and if the technology protected by the patent were an 
important component of a certain type of product, then the patent would constitute a barrier to 
entry. Later entrants into the market for this product would face low incentives to develop the 
technology further. When exactly a patent is protecting a technology for too long is hard to 
determine and is specific to the technology under consideration. Existing patent systems already 
recognize differences between technologies to some extent. For example, producers of ethical 
drugs in Europe may apply for supplementary protection certificates (SPCs), which extend 
patent protection by up to five and a half years beyond the statutory term. 
5 Economists use the term social welfare to refer to a measure of well being of a society. If an activity reduces social 
welfare it is said to create a welfare loss. In the analysis of firm behavior, social welfare is usually defined as the 
sum of consumer surplus (related to the gap between the price the consumer is willing to pay and the actual 
price) and producer profit (related to the gap between the price and the cost of production). For instance, if a 
monopoly raises prices beyond marginal cost, then this reduces the number of consumers willing to buy the 
goods sold by the monopoly. This reduces social welfare, because these consumers would have benefitted from 
buying the goods at a lower price. Additionally, the consumers still buying would have paid less, which would 
increase their consumer surplus. The latter effect is at the expense of producer profits, so the net effect of lower 
prices for existing consumers on social welfare would be zero. However there is still a loss to social welfare from 
the loss of sales to the consumers whose willingness-to-pay is above marginal cost but below the monopoly 
price.
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1.3 Can patent thickets be “Barriers to entry”?
The question we address in this report is whether the need to acquire large numbers of patents 
in specific complex technologies is creating barriers to entry in the antitrust sense. In these 
technologies firms adopt the strategy of patenting heavily in order to remain competitive. The 
resulting patent thickets are barriers to entry, if they create important negative externalities for 
firms not in possession of large patent portfolios and if no offsetting social benefits can be 
ascribed to the factors causing thickets to arise.
The main aim of our literature review below is to ascertain the positive innovation incentive 
effects and negative social costs that are associated with the growth of patent thickets. The 
empirical work in this study analyzes whether thickets affect SME entry and the strength of any 
such effect. Together these pieces of evidence allow us to assess whether patent thickets can 
be considered as antitrust barriers to entry and whether they are empirically important. Our 
answers to this second question are discussed in Section 2 and our empirical evidence on the 
question is supplied in Section 4.
Our empirical evidence is restricted to entry into patenting as there is currently no data on 
market entry dates of products that is matched to European patent data. As we note in the 
literature review there is evidence from the United States, which shows how entry into patenting 
is correlated with growth of firms. Additionally, it is hard to envisage how firms in sectors in 
which patenting is very intensive would be able to enter product markets without patent 
protection. 
Patent thickets create costs for the firms whose patents make up the thicket and they also 
create costs for the firms who are contemplating future invention of that type. For simplicity we 
refer to the first type of firm as an insider and the second as an outsider. Patent thicket insiders 
are typically larger incumbent firms, whereas some of the outsiders will be entrants. One 
definition of the problem we are investigating is the following:
Patent thickets constitute a barrier to entry into patenting, if they raise the cost of entry into 
patenting for outsiders to such a degree that social welfare is less than in the absence of 
patent thickets. 
If we find that patent thickets have economically significant effects on the entry and survival of 
SMEs, thickets constitute a barrier to entry into patenting provided changes to the patent 
system can be envisaged that reduce entry costs of SMEs without reducing social welfare 
significantly. It is important to emphasize that our objective is not to identify whether patents per 
se represent a barrier to entry (in most cases, they do), but whether patent thickets affect entry 
into patenting. 
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1.4 Brief Review of Findings
This report answers two questions:
1. Are there patent thickets and if so what are their effects on patenting, R&D investments 
and competition?
2. Is there a measurable effect on entry into patenting at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
by UK firms?
The first question is answered in Section 2 on the basis of a thorough review of the literature on 
patent thickets, which is now around 15 years old.6
The second question is answered in Section 4 on the basis of an empirical analysis that provides 
the first evidence on the effects of patent thickets on entry into patenting in Europe. 
Question 1
A review of the recent economics and management literature shows that there are two strands 
of empirical research pertinent to the first question set out above: The first is the literature on the 
entry and growth of SMEs, the second the literature on patent thickets. There is almost no 
research to date at the intersection of these strands of literature. 
The literature on the survival and growth of firms and especially SMEs shows that start-up firms 
are the source of much employment creation and destruction. Importantly, start-up firms that 
survive beyond the first five years are an important source of job growth (Haltiwanger et al., 
2010). These authors argue further that research into regulatory or market failures that have 
systematic effects on the survival of SMEs is lacking.
The literature on the growth of patenting, the sources of this growth, and the possible presence 
of patent thickets identifies patent portfolio races in response to litigation threats as a major 
source of growth of patenting during the 1980s and 1990s. During the 2000s, this growth has 
been augmented by the force of globalization, with firms taking out patents in increased numbers 
of jurisdictions, reflecting the need to protect themselves against competitors from a larger 
number of countries and increased opportunities for licensing. Accompanying this growth of 
patenting have been growing patent office workloads and an increased cost of prior art search, 
leading to more overlapping patents and more patents on minor inventions being granted. 
The literature has found that reforms to the courts dealing with patents in the United States 
increased incentives to patent and also improved the efficiency of the court system there. 
Otherwise the literature on patent thickets identifies only social costs of increased patenting, 
such as hold-up and associated increases in litigation, increased pendency of patents and 
growing uncertainty about validity of pending and granted patents. These changes taken 
together are considered to be consequences of the existence of patent thickets in some 
6 The first paper identifying patent strategies that have given rise to patent thickets in the modern era is by Grindley 
and Teece (1997). A number of important seminal papers on the topic followed in 2000 and 2001. 
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technology areas. This literature also contains a number of indications that entry into technologies 
affected by thickets is falling and that smaller firms that are actively patenting in these technologies 
are struggling to maintain a foothold in them.
Question 2
Our empirical analysis of entry into technology areas affected by patent thickets shows that 
entry decreases as patent thickets become denser, controlling for overall patenting activity in a 
technology area. We employ a recent measure of patent thicket density, which measures how 
frequently patent applications indicate that high levels of overlap exist between technologies of 
three or more firms over a period of three years. This measure allows us to detect patent 
thickets and to quantify their density.
Our empirical results confirm previous findings, surveyed in the literature survey, that patent 
thickets exist and have effects on firms’ patenting activities. Our empirical findings suggest that 
patent thickets are creating barriers to entry into patenting in some technology areas. However, 
we find that most new entrants into patenting located in the United Kingdom are not affected by 
these thickets, precisely because entry by these firms into affected technology areas is low.
1.5 Structure of the Study
The remainder of this text is structured as follows: Section 2 contains a literature review on 
patent thickets; Section 3 sets out how we measure patent thickets, Section 4 provides empirical 
findings on the prevalence of thickets and on their effects on entry into patenting. Section 5 
concludes the report.
In the Appendix we describe the data used, present additional material validating our measure 
of thicket density and provide additional tables and details on our estimation strategy.
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2 Literature Review
In this section we review the current economic and legal literature touching on patent thickets. 
This literature is very extensive and much additional detail can be found in the careful studies 
undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in the United 
States (2003; 2007; 2011). This literature also overlaps with a broader literature on patents and 
patent systems which is reviewed by Hall and Harhoff (2012) and WIPO (2011a) .
At the end of this section we also briefly review the literature on growth of small and medium 
sized enterprises.
2.1 Patent thickets
In the introduction we discussed six factors that contribute to the growth of patent thickets. 
Further, we note that self-reinforcing feedback effects cause patent thickets to grow in intensity 
once they have emerged. In this section we first review the literature on the factors that contribute 
to the emergence and growth of patent thickets in more detail, and then discuss possible 
feedback effects. Finally, we summarize the literature on the effects of patent thickets on 
competition and innovation.
2.1.1 Causes of Patent Thickets
In the introduction we noted the following six causal factors for the growth of patent thickets:
1. The strengthening and broadening of patent rights in the US and frequent use of 
injunctions in some jurisdictions;
2. The cumulative nature of science and technology and a shift towards complexity in many 
technologies;
3. Shifts in the degree of technological opportunity in various key technologies;
4. Strategic patenting by corporations and the assertion of patents by Patent Assertion 
Entities (PAEs);
5. Lack of resources and misaligned incentives at patent offices dealing with the resulting 
flood of patent applications;
6. Growth in trade of high technology products, leading to an increase in demand for 
patents by foreign firms and to the spread of patenting trends from Japan and the United 
States to other jurisdictions.
All of these factors contribute to the emergence and growth of patent thickets. But they are also 
responsible for an unprecedented level of demand for patents at patent offices around the 
world. This growth in demand can be seen as a sign of the increased globalization of innovative 
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activity, but also as a sign that feedback effects are at work and provide incentives for firms to 
amass increasingly large patent portfolios around the world.
Figure 1, drawn from on-going work at WIPO, shows trends in patent filings at major offices 
around the world. Both Japan and the United States exhibit relatively high levels of patenting 
early on, with rapid growth beginning during the 1960s in Japan and the 1980s in the US. 
Growth at the EPO, in the Republic of Korea, and China begins somewhat later, but is now 
climbing rapidly, especially in China. The early growth in Japan was partly due to the one-patent 
one-claim policy that existed during the post-World War II period until 1988. The transition to 
multiple claims somewhat obscures the rise of strategic patenting in Japan following the 
strengthening of patents in the United States in the 1980’s.7 Figure 1 shows that the U. S. was 
the second jurisdiction to experience strong growth in patent applications. Whereas the initial 
increases at the USPTO were most likely attributable to a strategic response to legal changes 
reviewed above (Jaffe, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Hall, 2005), later increases in applications 
have also been driven by forces of globalization.
Patent Filings at Selected Patent Offices
It is important to logically separate these two causes of increased demand for patents. The first, 
being a response to changes in the institutional framework, may possibly be associated with 
welfare gains that must be taken into account when evaluating the overall welfare impact of 
patent thickets. The second cause is the globalization of technological competition, but its 
costs and benefits may lie outside the scope of this study. We discuss below how patent offices 
have sought to cope with this source of demand.
Next we turn to the survey of factors contributing to growth in demand for patents and 
accompanying growth in patent thickets.
2.1.1.1 Strengthening of Patent Rights and the Role of the Courts
At the end of the 1970s the US patent system was widely perceived to be weak and ineffective. 
The US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was working inefficiently due to a shortage of 
7  There is some evidence that Japanese firms engaged in strategic patenting in technologies we do not associate 
with patent thickets (Rubinfeld and Maness, 2004).
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staff relative to the workload. Before the USPTO was able to grant a patent, the invention was 
already obsolete, especially in fast growing high technology sectors (Jaffe, 2000). 
In order to overcome this problem the U. S. Congress passed a series of laws that strengthened 
and modernized the patent office. Most importantly, Congress passed the Federal Court 
Improvement Act in 1982. This law created the centralized Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (CAFC). The CAFC has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases involving patents and 
claims against the federal government in a variety of subject matters. This court was created 
mainly for two reasons: to bring greater uniformity in patent law enforcement, and to reduce the 
case-load crisis in the federal courts of appeals (Jaffe, 2000).
In a series of studies based partly on practitioner interviews (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis 
and Hall, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004), Hall and Ziedonis show that one consequence of the creation 
of CAFC and the greater willingness of that court to grant injunctions was to increase the hold-
up threat to defendants in patent litigation and that this led to an increase in defensive patenting 
in the semi-conductor industry. The practice of “patent portfolio” racing for defensive purposes 
soon spread to other parts of the ICT industry (Hall, 2005) and to other jurisdictions (Harhoff et 
al., 2007).
Galasso and Schankerman (2010) study how the fragmentation of patent rights and the 
formation of CAFC affected the duration of patent disputes during the period 1975-2000, and 
thus the speed of technology diffusion through licensing. They have two main empirical findings. 
First, patent disputes in US district courts are settled more quickly when infringers require 
access to fragmented external rights, but this effect is much weaker after the introduction of the 
CAFC. Secondly, the introduction of the CAFC is associated with a direct and large reduction in 
the duration of disputes, which they attribute to less uncertainty about the outcome if patent 
disputes go to trial. This is a beneficial result of the formation of this court.
However, there is some evidence that patent litigation in the information and communications 
technologies as well as in software has increased substantially recently (Berneman et al., 2009; 
Federal Trade Commission, 2011; Carrier, 2012). The recent report by the FTC (2011) discusses 
the economic effects of injunctions and the criteria used when deciding on injunctions at great 
length. The report proposes that the courts should adhere to the 2006 Supreme Court decision 
in eBay v. MercExchange8 which set out four factors required to obtain a permanent injunction 
against a later patent. On the whole these factors should make obtaining an injunction much 
harder than previously, as they require US courts to consider the public interest in coming to a 
view about injunctions.
In Europe there has recently been a spate of court cases related to smartphones, in which firms 
have sought to obtain injunctions to delay entry of products while appealing to the European 
competition authorities to investigate the licensing or not of standards essential patents (Carrier, 
2012). German courts have been particularly central in these legal cases as they rule quickly 
and due a stronger presumption of validity built into its bifurcated enforcement system, 
preliminary injunctions are more frequently employed. Helmers and McDonagh (2012a), in 
contrast, find no evidence for changes in litigation behaviour before the relevant courts in 
8  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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England and Wales over the period 2000-2008.9 They also show that in contrast to the US, the 
overwhelming share of litigated patents is on pharmaceutical and chemical inventions and 
around of third of litigating parties are companies in pharmaceutical/chemical industry.
Overall, it is clear that the manner in which the courts interpret patent claims and the extent to 
which they are willing to provide injunctions play an important role in creating incentives for firms 
to create broad and imprecise claims and to pursue aggressive litigation strategies. As the 
recent FTC report (Federal Trade Commission, 2011) shows, there are many ways in which the 
courts can act to stem the tide of litigation in high technology markets such as Smartphones. A 
recent example of this type of behavior was provided by Judge Posner in an Illinois court Judge 
Posner, who canceled a jury trial between Apple and Motorola Mobility on the grounds that the 
case was moot because there were no damages and therefore, “neither party can establish a 
right of relief.”10
2.1.1.2 Cumulative Nature of Technology 
Patent thickets arise in complex technologies (Shapiro, 2000). This section reviews the evidence 
that technology is getting more complex and interwoven, not only in specific technological areas 
but across a large range of scientific disciplines. This trend is not driven by policy.11 
Jones (2009; 2010) shows that innovators produce important ideas at greater age as time goes 
by and that innovators increasingly specialize on narrower bodies of knowledge while working 
in larger teams. This evidence is consistent with a greater complexity of knowledge as knowledge 
accumulates. This evidence is derived from an analysis of scientific papers and patents as well 
as data on Nobel-prize winners and scientists more generally. 
Given these trends affecting science generally and patented technologies more specifically, the 
question remains whether there is evidence that complexity of technology has increased in 
specific technologies? Somaya, Teece and Wakeman (2011) argue that this is the case, citing 
the number of patents that cover the technologies embedded in high technology products such 
as laptop computers. 
Another way to look at this question is to examine the number of patents belonging to technology 
standards. Standards are mostly put in place to regulate the compatibility of technologies. 
Standards and patent pools are solutions to the bargaining problems that patent thickets create 
(Shapiro, 2000). As such they tend to arise where there are patent thickets.
Patent thickets are much older than their name: Mossoff (2011) and Lampe and Moser (2010) 
provide analyses of a sewing machine patent thicket that predates the current literature by 150
9  Yet, the Patents Court has recently seen a substantial increase in disputes, effectively tripling in 2011 relative to 
2010 (Financial Times, 3 August 2012). It is unclear, however, to which degree these disputes occur about 
patents on thickets-prone technologies.
10 Apple, Inc. and NeXT Software Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-08540, 2012.
11 Wang and von Tunzelmann (2000) define technologies as “bodies of knowledge which are person-embodied and 
software-oriented”. These bodies of knowledge can become more complex by becoming either broader, i.e. 
there is knowledge about more things to be absorbed and integrated, or deeper, i.e. knowledge becomes more 
intricate. It is in either sense that we discuss technological complexity here.
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 years. Their analyses suggest that this patent thicket consisted of a comparatively small number 
of firms and patents. The patent pool for sewing machines consisted of 7 or fewer independent 
companies and 9 patents. Overall the number of sewing machine patents in the pool period 
peaked at just over 150. Lampe and Moser (2012) study 20 pools formed between 1930 and 
1938. They show that the largest of these pools (Color Cinematography) was based on 143 
patents, while the largest number of participating firms was 5.
In contrast, contemporary standards involve far greater numbers of firms. The number of 
relevant patents in contemporary standards may be higher, but this is much harder to verify as 
the patents are not always clearly attributed to the standards. The data set out in Table 2.1 is 
derived from two recent studies on patent pools: (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011) and (Blind et 
al., 2011). This table shows the large number of participants in each standard and the even 
larger number of firms that were eligible to participate. This shows how difficult bargaining over 
access to patents on some contemporary technologies has become.
Pool Firms that are Patents in the Pool Age
  Eligible Partners Standard Pool – LL11* Std – Blind11* in years
1394 17 9 80 60 30 8
AVC 45 14 55 37 43 2
Bluetooth 25 8 141 116 10
DVB-T 10 4 29 5 51 3
DVD-1 12 4 289 81 9
DVD-2 12 7 289 195 8
MPEG-2 59 19 142 98 45 10
MPEG-4 71 24 106 94 43 9
WCDMA 34 10 348 36 1605 (UMTS) 3
*LL11 = Layne-Farrar and Lerner 2011; Blind11 = Blind et al. (2011)
[Table 2.1: Standards and Patent Pools]
The table is restricted to a set of patent pools that are or were recently active as well as the 
corresponding standards as identified in Layne–Farrar and Lerner (2011). We include data from 
Blind et al. (2011) on the number of INPADOC patent families associated with the standard 
where we could match the standards. In case of UMTS it should be noted that WCDMA is a 
subset of the UMTS standard. Blind et al. (2011) list a total of 5 standards with more patents 
than the Cinematography patent pool, which was by far the largest listed by Lampe and Moser 
(2012). The next largest pool with more than two firms in it that is discussed by Lampe and 
Moser (2012) is Stamped Metal Wheels with three firms and 90 patents. 
Blind et al. (2011) also note that standards are most frequently found in telecommunications- 
and object identification-technologies, audio/video coding standards and computer and 
consumer electronics hardware technologies, which are the technology areas usually defined as 
complex (see also Arora et al. 2009).
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2.1.1.3 Technological Opportunity
Technological opportunity, defined as the productivity of R&D (Klevorick et al., 1995), is very 
hard to measure. A simple but noisy measure is given by the total count of patents in a technology 
field. As patenting in high technology areas is affected by strategic considerations this measure 
is not likely to be very precise, nonetheless it is used by Noel and Schankerman (2013), who find 
that growth in this measure of technological opportunity has a positive effect on market value 
while reducing current patenting. This second finding is in line with the predicted effects of 
technological opportunity in Graevenitz et al. (2012) who argue that falling technological 
opportunity sharpens competition for patents and intensifies patenting while the opposite is true 
when technological opportunity is high. 
Empirically, Graevenitz et al. (2012) use citations to non-patent references to measure 
technological opportunity. This measure is only slightly better than the count of patent 
applications, but has received some support in the literature (Narin and Noma, 1985; Narin et 
al., 1997; Meyer, 2000). Using this measure Graevenitz et al. (2012) find that technological 
opportunity exerts a strong influence on patenting activity in high technology areas that are 
affected by patent thickets, confirming the results reported in Noel and Schankerman.
2.1.1.4 Strategic Patenting
Various types of strategic patenting are sometimes referred to as patent mining (Shapiro, 2000), 
patent portfolio races (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) and defensive patenting (Kortum and Lerner, 
1998). These terms all refer to the strategic use of the patent system for purposes that go 
beyond the protection of an individual innovation or innovative product.
Here we begin by reviewing activity which has been referred to as patent mining: “trying to get 
the most out of their patents by asserting them more aggressively than ever against possible 
infringing firms, even those who are not rivals (Shapiro, 2000)”. 
The immediate cause for patent thickets is the behavior of patenting entities, most importantly 
large corporations, whose products are based on semiconductor, computer, and 
telecommunications technologies. As of the mid-1980s these firms increased their patenting, 
not only in technology fields closely related to information technology, but in all technologies in 
which they were active (Hall, 2005). More recently intermediaries that aggregate patents and 
then assert these if necessary in courts – so-called patent assertion entities (PAEs) - have taken 
a more central stage in the patent mining game. This section surveys the literature on strategic 
patenting or patent mining while the following focuses on defensive patenting. While 
manufacturing firms pursue both strategies, PAEs do not patent defensively. 
We begin the discussion of strategic patenting in this section with semiconductor and information 
technology firms, although this behavior is not restricted to firms with these technologies.
Grindley and Teece (Grindley and Teece, 1997) discuss the fact that IP management became an 
important consideration for the top management of US corporations in the 1990s. They identify 
a regulatory shift supporting stronger enforcement of IP rights in the U.S. as a key cause and 
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cite the 1995 DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP. They also discuss the history 
of technology licensing in the semiconductor industry. Innovation in this industry was dominated 
by AT&T, which operated as a regulated monopoly until 1984. During this earlier period AT&T 
sought to minimize its costs by ensuring that new technology was spread quickly to suppliers. 
Therefore AT&T enforced a licensing regime under which all firms in the semiconductor industry 
shared technology without seeking to maximize their revenues. IBM is cited as another important 
source of technology for the early semiconductor industry. This firm too operated for some time 
as a regulated monopoly and was required to license technology on favorable terms. 
In 1985 Texas Instruments began to assert its own patents more aggressively than had previously 
been customary in the semiconductor industry. This shift in strategy was successful – the 
company was able to supplement dwindling profits from its semiconductor products with 
income from its growing technology licensing program. The strategy soon found imitators (Hall 
and Ziedonis, 2001). These followers were partly seeking higher profits and partly acting 
defensively. Defensive patenting arose as a response to the assertive IP strategies of firms like 
Texas Instruments. In the semiconductor industry patents are mostly granted at a time when the 
technology being protected is already being replaced due to the long grant lags. Therefore 
patents are not valuable as exclusion rights that protect the original invention. However, as 
Texas Instruments demonstrated in a number of court cases, patents could be used to extract 
substantial licensing fees from rival firms who had built incremental innovations on that invention 
or who were using standard-essential technologies (Grindley and Teece, 1997).
Hall and Ziedonis (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) combine interviews with representatives of 
semiconductor firms with econometric analysis of the patenting activities of these firms. They 
show that there was a shift in the patenting activity of semiconductor firms in around 1984; after 
this date firms in this industry started patenting much more actively than before. Interview 
partners confirmed that individual firms had set themselves targets for the growth of their patent 
portfolios. The level of patent applications was no longer predictable by the level of R&D 
investment. Instead, patent applications became a function of the capital intensity of the firms, 
because patents became used as a defense against production shutdowns due to injunctions. 
This is significant because it rules out an important alternative explanation for increased 
patenting: that it resulted from increased technological opportunities or demand for innovative 
products. Hall and Ziedonis thus show that a change in patenting strategy was the more likely 
explanation for the surge in patent applications by semiconductor firms. Parchomowsky and 
Wagner (2005) provide a number of case studies of strategic patenting in ICT, which focus on 
IBM, Qualcomm and Gemstar. 
Finally, Bekkers and West (2009) provide a very detailed analysis of patenting surrounding the 
GSM and UMTS mobile telecommunications standards. Their evidence indicates that the later 
UMTS standard contained essential patents belonging to a larger range of entities but that the 
concentration of patents was also higher. They also indicate that many patents added to the 
standard by Nokia and Ericsson around 1999, when the standard was set, are less cited and 
thus potentially of lower quality than patents from prior years. This evidence is suggestive of 
patent mining in the context of a standard setting process. The authors also document the 
failure of firms in the standard setting organization (ETSI) to agree on rules that would prevent 
patent mining in future standard setting contexts.
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Turning to other industries, Rubinfeld and Maness (Rubinfeld and Maness, 2004; Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2007) document strategic patenting by a Japanese firm in the personal watercrafts 
industry, while S. Wagner (2008) provides evidence for the franking devices industry. Joshi and 
Nerker (Joshi and Nerkar, 2011) study three patent pools within the optical disk industry. They 
show that before firms joined these patent pools they built up their patent portfolios more quickly 
than a control group of similar firms. Once they had joined the pools the rate of patenting 
decreased significantly. Similar results are reported by Lampe and Moser (2010; 2012) in two 
separate studies of patent pools in the 1850’s and 1930’s. These results are comparable to 
those of Bekkers and West (2009), but provide a stronger case for the assertion that patent 
mining is caused by competition to build patent portfolios before a standard is set and not by 
unobserved external factors in this industry.
2.1.1.5 Patent Assertion Entities
Recently, there has been a large increase in patent infringement cases filed by patent assertion 
entities (PAEs) in the US.12 The increase as well as number of high-profile cases, such as NTP 
vs. RIM or Eolas vs. Microsoft, triggered a heated debate on the role of PAEs in facilitating the 
so-called market for technology.13 Recent empirical evidence by Tucker (2011) suggests that 
PAE litigation has a negative effect on innovation carried out by alleged infringers. Bessen and 
Meurer (2012) provide some survey-based estimates that suggest a net loss in social welfare 
due to PAE litigation. 
Helmers and McDonagh (2012) look at patent cases at the Patents Court for England and 
Wales that involve PAEs . In contrast to the US, they cannot find any significant increase in the 
number of cases involving PAEs in the UK over the 9-year period 2000-2008. They find that only 
in one minor aspect of one case was a PAE successful in asserting infringement. Across cases, 
however, a PAE was much more likely to see its patents revoked. In fact, most of the cases 
before the Patents Court that involve PAEs are cases in which manufacturers successfully seek 
the invalidation of patents owned by PAEs. If a high likelihood of invalidation is interpreted as low 
patent quality, this evidence suggests that PAEs assert low quality patents.14 If low patent quality 
is associated with patent thickets, this would imply a link between thickets and PAE litigation. 
That is, if low quality patents provide incentives for PAEs to acquire and assert such patents, we 
would expect to see PAEs to assert relatively more patents in areas in which patent thickets 
exist.15 This is confirmed by empirical evidence on court cases that involve PAEs in the US 
(Risch, 2012) and the UK (Helmers and McDonagh, 2012), who show that PAE litigation occurs 
mostly in technological fields that are also affected most by patent thickets, such as information 
and communication technologies. 
12 Cf. FTC (2011) Chapter 2, Berneman et al. (2009) and https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/ .
13 See for example McDonough (2006), Myhrvold (2010), Chien (2009), Bessen et al. (2011).
14 However, Helmers and McDonagh (2012) also present evidence that suggests that the patents involved in the 
PAE case are not statistically significantly different from all other litigated patents at the High Court in terms of a 
number of patent value metrics. Moreover, when compared to patents protecting similar inventions, the patents 
asserted by PAEs score higher on all of these value metrics. The suggestion is that the quality of a patent and its 
value are not necessarily the same thing. 
15 See Reitzig et al. (2007) and Farrell and Shapiro (2008) for theoretical evidence that the assertion of low quality 
patents is a profitable strategy. 
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2.1.1.6 Defensive Patenting
Now we turn to review defensive patenting. Shapiro (2004) provides the following definition: 
“Defensive patenting refers to the practice of seeking patents in order to defend oneself from 
patent infringement actions brought by others. Under this strategy, the company does not plan 
to assert its patent proactively against others, but it can counterattack with its own patent 
infringement claims if sued for infringement”.
Defensive patenting is a strategy pursued by firms seeking to defend themselves against hold-
up – the attempt to extract payments through the threat of legal action and the leveraging of 
injunctions – by patent mining firms. Defensively patenting firms are reluctant litigants, 
strategically constructing portfolios of patents to avoid going to court. A commonly adopted 
defense against hold-up is the threat of countersuits and subsequent cross-licensing. This 
strategy is less effective when firms are faced with patent assertion entities (PAEs), as these are 
not susceptible to the threat of hold-up themselves.
Ziedonis (2004) demonstrates that semiconductor firms patent more aggressively, if their patents 
cite a more dispersed set of rival firms. This effect is particularly pronounced, if firms have 
themselves invested heavily in technology-specific assets (e.g. manufacturing equipment, which 
can be a large partially sunk cost for semiconductor firms). This finding shows that firms which 
were likely to be negotiating with a larger set of rivals for access to their patents sought to build 
larger patent portfolios, in order to strengthen their bargaining positions. This logic was also 
supported by a number of submissions from industry representatives to the 2003 study of the 
Federal Trade Commission into the balance of Competition and Patent Law (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2003). 
Chien (2009) also studies defensive patenting. Her data suggest that the strategy, which is 
supposed to keep large firms out of court, is at least an incomplete strategy. She finds that 
public and large private companies initiated 42% of all lawsuits studied, 28% of the time against 
another large company. Defensively patenting firms also defend against other suits, brought by 
individuals, small inventors and non-practicing entities.
While defensive patenting is clearly not always effective, it is most likely the main strategy in 
generating the large increases in patent filings and grants we have documented above (Hegde 
et al., 2009). Such a patent portfolio strategy requires an enduring strategic commitment and is 
often then exploited by firms offensively when they have seen other sources of revenue dry up 
(Rubinfeld and Maness, 2004; Clarkson and De Korte, 2006). However, it is not likely that the 
majority of patent applicants are actively pursuing this kind of patent mining; rather the majority 
are defensive patent applicants seeking to protect themselves against litigation while contributing 
to the overloading of the patent system in equal measure. 
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2.1.1.7 Incentives for Patent Examiners and Patent Quality and Patent 
Backlogs
Jaffe and Lerner (2004) and Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that the increase in the overall 
number of patent filings at the USPTO was accompanied by a drop in the average quality of 
granted patents. While there is no canonical definition of patent quality, the existing definitions 
centre on the substantive standards of patent examination including the enablement function of 
a patent. Wagner (2008) defines patent quality as the “capacity of a granted patent to meet (or 
exceed) the statutory standards of patentability – most importantly, to be novel, non-obvious, 
and clearly and sufficiently described.” Graf (2007) adds the enablement condition: “how well 
the patent meets the statutory requirements: patentable subject-matter, utility, novelty, non-
obviousness, and adequate written description and enablement.”16
Hall and Harhoff (2004) suggest that in addition to statutory patentability requirements patent 
quality depends on the uncertainty over the validity and breadth of the patent claims.17 This is 
an essential requirement in the context of patent thickets, because the fuzzy boundaries created 
by poorly defined claims contribute to overlapping patent claims. That is, an increase in the 
number of patent filings per se is not a sufficient condition for the proliferation of thickets; the 
fact that more patents with ill-defined boundaries are granted is crucial for thickets to emerge. 
Patent quality is also negatively affected by the increased difficulty in searching for prior art. The 
problem has become more severe as the number of filings has been increasing, especially in 
countries such as Japan, Korea and most recently China as claims are not necessarily available 
in English.18 Also the expansion of patentable subject matter to cover software and business 
methods has contributed to the problem.19 The difficulty in finding all existing prior art also 
favours the granting of patents whose claims overlap with existing patents and hence contribute 
to the growth of thickets. While fuzzy claim boundaries are hard to measure empirically, patent 
quality can be gauged by looking at outcomes of opposition and invalidity court cases. Allison 
et al. (2011), for example, find that software patents are particularly likely to be invalidated in 
court in the US, which may be interpreted as indicative evidence of their low quality.
Patent quality has also been shown to be negatively affected by the resources patent offices are 
able to expend to examine patent applications. Lemley and Shapiro (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005) 
point out that at USPTO patent examiners spend on average only 18 hours working on each 
patent over a period of three years. In a series of papers Quillen et al. (2001; 2003; 2009) 
document the extent of the pro-applicant bias at USPTO, to the extent that this is manifested in 
the probability of a patent eventually being granted in spite of initial and subsequent rejections 
of the application.
16 See also Sternitzke et al. (2008). 
17 See also Bessen and Meurer (2008) and FTC (2011) for discussion of the failure of “notice” created by fuzzy 
patent claims. 
18 Chakroun (2012), for example, points out that patent information is only available in electronic format for 80 
offices out of 184 member states. Even for offices that make their data available, often only limited bibliographic 
information is available, for example claims are often not available. Information on the legal status of patents is 
even harder to obtain.
19 At the same time, non-patent references play a particularly important role in certain technologies in which low-
quality patents are particularly frequent, such as software in the U.S. (Graf, 2007).
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Lei and Wright (2009) find that paradoxically examiners at the USPTO spend more time searching 
for prior art on patents that are later rejected at the EPO than on patents that are granted by the 
EPO. They argue that this shows that examiners at the USPTO are able to identify weak patents, 
but that they may be unable to reject as many as would be socially optimal due to pro-applicant 
rules. A problem of this “pro-applicant approach,” which presumes patentability of an invention, 
is that the USPTO has difficulties in rejecting patent applications, which contributes to the patent 
quality problem (Allison et al., 2011). Because of the quality problems surrounding patents 
issued by the USPTO, the FTC has called for more funding to be provided to the patent office 
for the purpose of improving patent quality and notice, cf. page 16 in Shapiro (2000), also 
Federal Trade Commission, 2011.   
Harhoff et al. (2012) show empirically that their measure of patent thickets has a significant 
negative effect on the probability that a patent application is opposed at EPO. They argue that 
in a patent thicket the incentive for firms to oppose each other’s patent applications falls as each 
new patent overlaps with the patents of many other firms and a public goods effect arises when 
one of these opposes the patent. Additionally, firms may avoid opposing a rival’s patent if they 
can expect the rival to retaliate by opposing their own applications. In keeping with this Harhoff 
et al. (Graevenitz et al., 2012; 2011; Harhoff et al., 2012) show that opposition is lowest for firms 
at the center of patent thickets. This suggests that post-grant opposition cannot be relied upon 
to reduce the effects of patent thickets on patent quality.
The steep increase in patent filings and their complexity have caused patent offices around the 
world to build up large backlogs of pending patent applications. Backlogs introduce uncertainty 
into patent systems by increasing the length of pendency and by exerting additional pressure 
on patent offices to process more patent applications with the same amount of resources. The 
increased uncertainty may affect firms’ filing behaviour directly, but backlogs can also affect 
thickets indirectly through the impact they have on the resources available for the examination 
of patent applications, i.e., the effect on thickets works through the negative impact on patent 
quality. 
The most recent data for USPTO indicate that there were 536,604 patent applications in 2011 
and that there were 690,967 patents awaiting a first action by an examiner. This is down from a 
peak of 771,529 patents in 2008 (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2011). Hegde 
(2012) shows that the number of pending patents at USPTO has been increasing since 1997 
and had quadrupled by 2009. He reports that first-action pendency20 nearly quadrupled between 
1991 and 2010, from 7.6 months to 25.7 months. Meanwhile Quillen et al. (2009) indicate that 
a comparison of the USPTO application backlog at the end of 2008 with the Net Disposal rate 
in 2008 yields a 60 month examination backlog.21 
Harhoff and Wagner (2009) document that at the European Patent Office (EPO) the number of 
pending patent cases per examiner increased from 24 in 1978 to 120 in 1998 and that the 
average number of claims per patent increased from just under 10 to just over 15 in the same 
period. The examination period in 1994 lasted on average between 4 years for withdrawn 
20 First-action pendency measures the time between filing of a patent application and the examiner’s formal 
communication of a preliminary decision regarding patentability. 
21 It should be note that according to USPTO data pendency rates reached a maximum there in 2008 and have 
slightly declined since.
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patents to 5 years for refused patents. For granted patents the average duration of examination 
was 4.6 years. They report that in 1998 EPO received 90,479 patent applications and 330,332 
applications were pending. Ten years later Brimelow (2011) cites 226,000 applications and 
490,000 pending applications. The most recent figure comparable to those provided by Harhoff 
and Wagner (2009) suggests that average duration of examination at EPO has increased to 5.2 
years for 2011.22
2.1.1.8 Growth in International Patent Applications
Another important driver of the observed overall surge in worldwide patent filings over the past 
two decades is the strong increase in the number of subsequent patent filings. They account for 
more than half of growth in overall worldwide patent filings between 1995 and 2007. According 
to WIPO (2011b), first filings grew on average at 4.2 percent between 1990 and 2007, but 
subsequent filings grew even faster at 6.8 per cent. These subsequent filings consist 
overwhelmingly of non-resident filings, which means they are patent applications on the same 
invention in multiple jurisdictions. The most likely explanation for this increase in the average 
international patent family size is increased international activity by companies in the form of 
exporting, foreign direct investment, and licensing. This explanation is supported by at least 
three observations (WIPO, 2011b). First, PCT national phase entries account for the largest 
share in the increase in subsequent filings. Second, the increase in non-resident filings comes 
to a large extent from increased patenting among the world’s largest economies, including 
China. Third, in countries that became more integrated in the world economy, such as Mexico, 
Russia or South Africa, most of the growth in incoming filings is due to subsequent filings. This 
would suggest that at least some of the rapid growth in patent applications is driven simply by 
the increased economic need for international patent protection. Nevertheless, the perceived 
need to file the same patent application in several jurisdictions is also likely to be influenced by 
any of the other aforementioned factors.
2.1.2 Feedback Effects
Above we discuss six factors that drive the observed growth in worldwide patent thickets. While 
each these factors are each separately at work, they are likely to interact and create powerful 
self-reinforcing feedback effects. We noted three avenues of feedback in the introduction:
1. The inability of the patent office to weed out a rival’s marginal patents creates incentives 
to apply for an increasing number of patents, once it is established that the rival is 
benefitting from these patents.
2. The increased pendency of patent applications at patent offices creates incentives 
to apply for vague and overly broad patents to create uncertainty for rival applicants. 
These patents initially claim much more subject matter than the office finally accepts as 
patentable subject matter.
3. The threat of injunctions creates immensely strong incentives for firms to build up large 
portfolios of patents in order to be able to counter patent litigation. As noted above this 
strategy is only partly successful since it does not protect the applicant faced with a suit 
from a PAE (Chien, 2009).
22 This number is reported by the Patentia blog here: http://patentia.co.uk/?p=7
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There is to date no work that seeks to identify or is able to quantify the strength of these 
feedback mechanisms. There is much descriptive and anecdotal evidence for the fact that firms 
reacted to rivals entering into a portfolio building effort by doing the same in Hall and Ziedonis 
(2001), Rubinfeld and Maness (2004) and Wagner (2008). Ziedonis (2004) shows that 
fragmentation of cited patents increases incentives to patent, which is consistent with feedback 
of this kind. Graevenitz et al. (2012) find that the persistence of patenting is reduced in complex 
technologies. Here firms’ patenting efforts react much more strongly to rivals’ patenting than in 
discrete technologies. This too is consistent with feedback. What is lacking in the literature are 
studies that use shocks to the level of scrutiny provided by a patent office to identify the extent 
of feedback to the number of marginal patents that firms apply for.
The effects of increasing pendency are even harder to study in such a way that its causal effect 
can be identified as pendency rates do not display discrete jumps.
In the case of injunctions we also have a number of anecdotes indicating that firms react to 
these (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Federal Trade Commission, 2003; 
2011), but no studies providing solid evidence of causal effects. This is slightly more surprising 
than in the two cases discussed above, as such studies are possible in principle.
2.1.3 Effects of Patent Thickets on Competition and 
Innovation
The previous sections of this literature review have shown that patent thickets arose from 
changes in relatively few firms’ patenting strategies, which then fed back to change patenting 
behavior of many more firms. This raises the question of whether the growth of patent thickets 
has also affected firms R&D investments and possibly competition in product markets.
The literature on patent systems and patent thickets does not provide systematic analysis of 
these questions, mostly because they are very difficult to address: collecting the type of data 
that would allow a comprehensive analysis and developing models that encompass competition, 
entry, investments and feedbacks between these is challenging. However, there are studies that 
provide partial answers by studying R&D investments and or market outcomes. These studies 
are surveyed in this section. At the end of the section we review the findings and connect them 
to theoretical work that sheds some light on their significance. This also allows us to link this 
discussion to the question of sunk costs and possible barriers to entry.
2.1.3.1 Review of empirical findings23
In their paper on patent thickets in the semiconductor industry Hall and Ziedonis (2001) discuss 
the level of R&D investment by incumbent firms and show that the propensity to patent (count 
of granted patents / R&D investment) rises for semiconductor firms after 1982 and is level for 
manufacturing firms until 1993. This implies that semiconductor firms applied for increasing 
23 Most of the papers cited in this section identify technology areas affected by patent thickets using counts of 
patents or use prior knowledge of thickets from other sources such as interviews. In several cases the 
fragmentation measure is used to identify thickets. The intensity of the thicket is then related either to the count 
of patents or to fragmentation. 
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numbers of patents per R&D dollar between 1982 and 1993. By extension, changes in R&D 
investment levels cannot account for all of the increase in patent applications that they document. 
Their analysis is restricted to semiconductor firms for whom they are able to collect information 
on R&D investments and patent stocks. Also, they exclude firms that are so large and diversified 
that it becomes difficult to relate R&D investments to a specific technology or product market 
(e.g., IBM, Hitachi, etc.). 
Their interview analysis supports the view that the patenting increases they observe in the 
semiconductor industry, are the result of strategic changes in patenting behavior, that are largely 
divorced from R&D investment choices. While this may seem improbable, there is ample 
evidence of this in the literature on the semiconductor industry (Federal Trade Commission, 
2003; Somaya, 2003). Further evidence supporting the view that R&D investment is not very 
responsive to patenting incentives is provided by Nicholas (2011). He shows that a reform of the 
patent system in the United Kingdom in 1883, which significantly reduced patenting fees, had 
a very strong effect on the number of patents being applied for, but no measurable impact on 
the level of innovation in Britain, as measured by citations to British patents in the United 
States.24
Once patent thickets arise, effects on levels of R&D spending and on the degree of competition 
are hard to predict. On the one hand the need to engage in patent portfolio races could be 
regarded as an increasing cost of doing business, which might reduce investment and activity 
in affected technologies. On the other, those firms that have successfully built the largest patent 
portfolios may have gained a strategic advantage. If this strategic advantage leads to greater 
concentration of sales and higher profits in affected product markets, then an increase in R&D 
investments by some firms could be expected. This mechanism is discussed in more detail 
below.
Noel and Schankerman (2013) investigate patenting in the computer software industry. They 
find that R&D efforts of the software firms in their sample did not change significantly between 
1980 and 1999. However, there is some weak evidence of heterogeneity of R&D investment 
across firms, depending on the concentration of patent portfolios of the firm’s four main rivals. 
Greater concentration of citations in these rivals’ patent portfolios implies that a firm undertakes 
less R&D in some of their specifications. 
Cockburn et al. (2010) present evidence from a representative survey of innovating firms in 
Germany. They have information on the introduction of new products into the market and find 
significant differences between firms that rely on licenses and those that do not. The ability of 
firms that must license-in patents to introduce a larger share of innovative products is reduced, 
if the references in their patents are to a more fragmented set of firms. In contrast, they find a 
positive effect of fragmentation on innovative performance of firms that do not rely on licenses. 
These results support the view that effects of patent thickets on R&D investments and 
competition are not evenly spread amongst firms. In particular, those firms that are not easily 
held up benefit, whilst those that must license-in technologies, are at a disadvantage. This 
paper is one of the few to provide direct evidence of effects of thickets on product market 
competition.
24 See also Moser (2005) and Lerner (2002), both of whom show that innovative activity is not related to variations 
across countries in patent systems during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
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Additional evidence of heterogeneous effects is provided by Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011), 
who study entry in relatively narrow software markets over the period 1990-2004. They construct 
counts of patents relevant to a given product market based on a text-search algorithm and IPCs 
that assigns patents to markets. While this measure certainly captures something related to 
thickets, it does not measure directly the degree of overlap in these patents. Cockburn and 
MacGarvie find substantial effects: a 1% increase in the number of existing patents is associated 
with a .8% drop in the number of product market entrants. They also find that firms that hold 
relevant patents before entry are substantially more likely to eventually enter a market. Concerns 
over endogeneity of patent counts are somewhat mitigated by fact that the authors exploit 
arguably exogenous variation in patent eligibility of software over time. These findings 
demonstrate that the presence of large numbers of patents affect entry and by extension 
competition in software markets. 
In an analysis of determinants of patenting in Europe, which accounts for effects of patent 
thickets using the same measure as this report, Graevenitz et al. (2012) show that large and 
small firms react to patent thickets differently. They find that increases in patent thicket density 
increase patent applications of owners of large patent portfolios but decrease patent applications 
by owners of smaller patent portfolios in technology areas covering complex technologies like 
telecommunications. In discrete technologies, such as pharmaceuticals, where thicket density 
is significantly lower, large and small firms react to variation in thicket density in the same way. 
These findings are noteworthy because they are consistent with a process in complex 
technologies through which holders of large patent portfolios increasingly dominate these 
technologies, making it more difficult for firms holding smaller portfolios to establish a foothold.
Finally, recent work on a number of patent pools reveals that these arrangements, which are 
created to prevent hold-up, have the effect of reducing innovation and patenting by those firms 
that are members of the pools (Lampe and Moser, 2010; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011; Lampe and 
Moser, 2012). These studies focus on small numbers of firms that are caught up in patent 
thickets and are using cooperative mechanisms to reduce the problem of hold-up. The 
significance of these studies is that they are able to provide detailed and objective measures of 
innovative success. For instance, (Lampe and Moser, 2010) study the Sewing Machine 
Combination (1856-1877) and show that the number of stitches per minute remained constant 
at about 2000 stitches per minute during the period that the Sewing Machine Combination was 
active. 
The consistency with which authors have recently found that different patent pools have had a 
stultifying effect on innovation is important. The result suggests that private resolution of hold-
up through patent pools does not yield outcomes that would allow us to simply rely on market 
mechanisms to resolve the problem of thickets as has been suggested by some (Mossoff, 
2009).
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2.1.3.2 Further findings on specific technologies and specific types of 
firms:
Here we briefly review the discussion of patent thickets in four specific technology areas. These 
are semiconductors and information technology, software, biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
Apart from nanotechnology, all of these are already cited by Shapiro (2000) as harboring patent 
thickets. While semiconductor technology and software are areas of research connected to 
established product markets, biotechnology and especially nanotechnology are more recent 
technologies for which markets are still nascent or only just developing. This has implications for 
the effects of patent thickets as this section shows.
Semiconductors, Telecommunications
These technologies are the most intensively studied in the literature on patent thickets. As 
outlined in Section 2.1.1.4 commercially relevant patent thickets arose in semiconductor 
technology first (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). Here the threat of hold-up had such 
strong commercial implications that firms changed their patenting strategies (Grindley and 
Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Somaya, 2003). The patent portfolio races taking place 
in these technologies overwhelmed USPTO and subsequently also other offices, leading to the 
backlogs documented in Section 2.1.1.7 (Hall, 2005).
It is these technologies that are most seriously affected by PAEs (Berneman et al., 2009) and 
where patent litigation is affecting important commercial decision such as mergers and 
acquisitions (Carrier, 2012).
Software
Software became patentable in the United States via a sequence of court decisions (Bessen 
and Hunt, 2007; Hall and MacGarvie, 2010). Initially these decisions were viewed as negative 
for downstream application software firms by financial markets (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010). It 
appears that its main consequence was an increase in software patenting by hardware firms 
rather than an increase in inventive activity by software firms, most of which still do not patent 
today.25 Thus the result of this subject matter expansion was an increase in defensive patenting 
rather than an increase in invention. 
Innovation in the software industry is typically cumulative and relies heavily on the combination 
of existing components and processes, which means that interoperability standards are 
particularly important (Hall and MacGarvie, 2010). Patents on software face considerably 
uncertainty over patent eligibility and patentability, and built-in difficulties in defining claims 
(Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011). 26
25 Also see Graham and Sichelman (2010) for evidence that patents in this sector are relatively unimportant in 
obtaining venture capital financing. 
26 In particular prior art search for software patents used to be and continues being problematic.
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Biotechnology
Heller and Eisenberg (1998) raised the specter of patent thickets affecting the progress of 
biomedical research in a widely cited paper. Their argument was based on the increasing use of 
patents by academic researchers working in this field and the complexity and modularity of 
biotechnology research (Pénin and Wack, 2008). More recently Cohen, Walsh, et al. (Walsh et 
al., 2003; 2005; Cohen and Walsh, 2008) find that academic researchers are not much impeded 
by patents. Rather it may be secrecy amongst researchers that is holding back progress. Their 
results are based on surveys of biomedical researchers in the United States.
Most recently, Huys et al. (2009) undertake a detailed analysis of the claims contained in patents 
related to 22 inherited diseases. From this very detailed analysis they conclude that there is a 
patent thicket, which affects genetic diagnostic methods. However, this thicket affects mainly 
non-profit applicants, which may mean that currently the thicket does not have strong commercial 
implications. The authors also show that many claims on the patents studied are broad and 
imprecise, leading to high levels of uncertainty. This is likely to be as important, if not more 
important, than the thicket itself in creating obstacles to commercialization and future research 
in this technology area.
In 2010 the validity of certain claims in US patents covering genes was thrown into question by 
Judge Robert W. Sweet (Hemphill, 2012). This case has created additional uncertainty in the 
field of biotechnology at a time when the commercial application of the genetic testing and 
genetic treatments is coming within reach. Thus far there is little evidence of strategic patenting 
in this technology area that would resemble anything that has been seen in semiconductor 
technology. However, this may simply be the consequence of the small number of products 
currently in the market that are using patents held by private entities willing or able to go to court 
(Holman, 2012). 
Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is not mentioned by Shapiro (2000). The first discussions of a potential patent 
thicket in this field are provided by Bawa (2005) and Lemley (2005). However, both of these 
papers and others at the time are outlining a possibility based on large volumes of patenting and 
a complex technology. Since then no hard evidence of a thicket in this technology has emerged 
in the literature. 
2.1.3.2 Discussion of empirical findings in the light of theoretical work 
on market structure
The empirical studies we have reviewed in the previous section indicate that patenting levels are 
only weakly connected to R&D investment levels, but that patenting strategies are having 
measureable and economically significant effects on entry and on the competitive position of 
firms with weaker patent portfolios. 
Are these effects of patent thickets linked to the question whether patent thickets create barriers 
to entry? This section briefly discusses what recent economic theory contributes to answering 
this question.
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As was briefly noted above within patent thickets those firms with larger patent portfolios may 
be at a strategic advantage. This explains the scramble to buy the patent portfolios of companies 
such as Nortel in 2011, pitting Google against an alliance of Apple, Microsoft, Sony and RIM. 
Similarly it explains why Google bought a substantial part of Motorola a little later on that year. 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) characterize patenting in the semiconductor industry as a series of 
“patent portfolio races”. These races have winners and losers. Over time the losers will find it 
increasingly costly to do business in technologies affected by patent thickets. As patenting 
strategy becomes increasingly important for high technology firms, competition to build larger 
patent portfolios is becoming an activity similar to competition to build strong brands or 
competition to create better innovations. 
Competition for stronger brands, better technology (Sutton, 2007) or even a better distribution 
network (Ellickson, 2007) leads to concentration of markets through a process of escalation of 
expenditures on advertising, R&D or distribution. As expenditures (sunk costs) necessary to 
compete rise, more and more firms exit affected markets and these become concentrated. 
Where sunk costs on R&D are concerned it is mostly assumed by economists that these are 
beneficial to society and therefore these sunk costs are not usually regarded as antitrust barriers 
to entry.
The evidence we reviewed in the previous section is consistent with the effects of an escalation 
of expenditure on patenting by some firms. If these firms can make it harder for others with 
weaker portfolios to compete, then we can expect more exit and less entry into technologies 
affected by patent thickets. We would also expect to see firms with weaker patent portfolios 
struggle to compete in product markets, as it becomes increasingly costly to supply new 
products that do not infringe on rivals’ patents. 
In evaluating the welfare effects of an escalation of expenditure on patenting it is clear that no 
direct social benefits arise from patent portfolio races – firms have generally not increased R&D 
investments, they have only increased the number of patent applications. Thus if the escalation 
of expenditure on patenting is not to be classified as creating barriers to entry, then this must be 
because of a socially beneficial side effect of one of the causes of the escalation of expenditure 
on patenting. Our review of these causes above uncovered only the reduction in litigation 
duration and the decreases in uncertainty that were consequences of the creation of the CAFC 
in the United States. These benefits are very much restricted to that jurisdiction, so that it seems 
unlikely that they could counterbalance any effects on entry or the composition of firms that 
escalating expenditure on patenting may have.
The main question our empirical analysis below seeks to answer is whether the process of 
escalation of expenditure on patenting is having economically measurable effects on entry of UK 
firms into specific technology sectors. If so, we would argue that this literature review has 
provided much evidence in favor of the view that patent thickets are creating barriers to entry 
into patenting in affected technology areas.
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2.2 Small and medium-sized enterprises 
Policy makers widely believe that small and medium sized (SMEs) businesses create most of the 
new jobs in modern economies. Therefore, it is often thought that support for SMEs is an 
important element of policy that is directed towards creation of more employment and growth. 
It is also true, that previous work for the UK has shown that growth comes from a small share 
of SMEs (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2010). These researchers find that between 2005 and 2008, 
only around 6 per cent of registered companies accounted for more than half of total employment 
growth.
In this section we briefly review work on the survival and growth of SMEs in the literature, with a 
particular focus on the UK. We focus in particular on the link with firms’ patenting activity. This 
will help us gauge the implications of our findings on how firms’ patenting activity is affected by 
thickets for their performance in the market place.
The most recent study on SMEs and job creation in the United States is by Haltiwanger et al. 
(Haltiwanger et al., 2010). This paper focuses mainly on the question whether SMEs create 
most private sector jobs. The paper provides new evidence as well as a review of methodological 
and statistical problems that plague the literature on SMEs and job creation. One main finding 
is that 40% of jobs created by young start-up firms are eliminated by the exit of these firms after 
five years. However, those young firms that survive are found to grow much faster than previously 
existing firms. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) seek to replicate results of Neumark et al. 2011 (Neumark 
et al., 2011) who find that small firms contribute disproportionately to net job growth in the U.S. 
economy. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) show that controlling for age removes any correlation 
between firm size and net job creation. The reason for this is that young firms and especially 
start-up firms are generally also small firms. In the United States young and small firms 
disproportionately create and destroy jobs. This means that it is not so much the size of the firm 
that matters for job creation rather than the age of the firm. 
Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) use matched census data for the US manufacturing 
sector to show a strong, positive correlation between first-time patenting and subsequent 
growth. They suggest that first-time patentees experience exceptionally high growth as a 
consequence of introducing new products. While it remains unclear to which degree the 
patenting decision itself causes the increase in the number products, this evidence is relevant 
to our study. We look at entry in form of first-time patenting, which means that evidence provided 
by Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011) could suggest that a negative correlation between 
first-time patenting and thickets is indicative of a negative association between thickets and 
growth. Helmers and Rogers (2011) offer some evidence on the link between patenting and 
growth for the UK. They look at start-up companies’ patenting decision shortly after they enter 
the market. They also find a strong positive correlation between start-up firms’ patenting 
decision and their subsequent growth performance.
Regarding firm survival, there are two relevant studies in the United Kingdom: Disney et al. 
(2003) and Helmers and Rogers(2010). Disney et al. use the Annual Business Inquiry 
Respondents Database (ARD), which starts in 1972. The data contains information on all UK 
manufacturing establishments over 100 employees and a sample of smaller establishments. 
36 A Study of Patent Thickets
The authors have to restrict analysis to the period 1986 to 1991 for their study due to changes 
in methodology in the underlying data. The study is undertaken at the establishment level, but 
firm level variables are taken into account in the econometric analysis. In 1986 there are 143,000 
establishments in the data. Focus of the study is on exit rates, i.e. on survival. Similarly to the 
US studies it is shown that the unconditional probability of survival declines with age. The decline 
is greater for single establishments which are typically smaller establishments. Once the authors 
condition on firms’ and establishments’ characteristics, they show that it is the firms’ initial size 
that reduces the probability of exit significantly. This effect gets weaker with age. Overall the 
study shows that in the UK as in the United States small firms are more likely to exit. However, 
this study does not show whether the probability is disproportionately higher for smaller firms. 
Also due to the econometric specification chosen it is hard to analyze the effects of age clearly. 
The authors find that after five years 65% of new establishments exit. For establishments that 
are part of multi-establishment firms this figure falls. Unfortunately the authors do not provide 
information on the extent of the reduction for such establishments.
The study by Helmers and Rogers (2010) tracks the survival of a complete cohort of firms 
registered in Britain in 2001. Of the 162,000 firms in this cohort, just over 30% of the firms have 
exited after four years. The authors show that “IP active” firms (i.e. firms that have obtained 
either a patent or a trade mark) are significantly less likely to exit than other firms. This is true 
both in descriptive results provided and in results conditional on a large number of firm, sector 
and location specific controls. 
The papers reviewed here demonstrate that high rates of entry and exit are characteristic of 
SMEs in the UK and elsewhere. The more recent literature notes that SMEs which survive 
beyond the first five years often make an important contribution to job growth and productivity 
improvements in an economy. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) also note the need for a better 
understanding of the challenges faced by SMEs in these first five years. The literature on the 
growth and patenting nexus discussed above suggest that firms’ decision to patent may 
contribute to their growth success, especially so in the case of first-time patentees. It is against 
this background that we analyze the effect of thickets on firms’ first-time patenting decision.
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3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Methodology to identify entry and exit of firms
In this report, we are concerned with the ability of firms to compete in particular technology 
spaces. Therefore we define entry and exit in terms of the patenting behavior of firms rather than 
as market entry or survival in a market. In the case of entry, this approach has the advantage of 
providing us with a pool of all potential entrants, that is, we also observe those firms that could 
have entered a given technology, but chose not to do so. If we were to consider product market 
entry, we would only observe the set of firms that entered the market but not the entire pool of 
potential entrants, which makes a study of entry impossible.
In addition, linking the analysis of market entry in a specific market context to patenting activity 
requires a great deal of work on linking patents to products and product markets. We are not 
aware of any research that contains this kind of analysis at the level of an entire patent system. 
For this reason we limit our analysis to entry into patenting activity, which is a reasonable proxy 
for a firm’s ability and desire to compete in a certain area. However, looking at entry into patenting 
conditional on the firm existing is not able to capture any negative effects of patent thickets on 
the creation of new firms, so our estimates are likely to understate the true social impact of this 
phenomenon. 
3.2 Methodology for the measurement of patent 
thickets 
In this section we discuss a number of ways in which economists have sought to quantify the 
extent of patent thickets. Some of these measures have also been used to identify effects of 
patent thickets for different types of patent applicants.
The main problem that patent thickets create for firms are the costs of adequate patent search, 
the ability to identify all relevant technology, and the consequent threat of hold-up ex post, even 
if adequate due diligence has been done. This problem is most likely to arise for firms producing 
and selling products that use a complex technology, for instance the producer of a mobile 
phone. Such a firm cannot effectively ensure that its products do not infringe on patents granted 
to another firm, because there are usually very many relevant patents (Shapiro, 2000), because 
the claims in these patents are not always precise (Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2007) and because it is increasingly in the strategic interest of some applicants to hide 
their applications within the system for as long as the rules allow (Hegde et al., 2009), leading 
to uncertainty over exactly which patents and claims will be granted in the end. 
Therefore, a measure of patent thicket density measuring the hold-up potential existing in 
different parts of the patent system is needed. In the early literature on patent thickets these 
were identified using qualitative techniques such as interviews (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Both 
in this paper and in Hall (2005) changes in the number of patent applications that are the result 
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of the growth of patent thickets are documented. While increased patent applications can be a 
signal that a patent thicket is growing, there are many other possible explanations for increased 
patent applications such as greater technological opportunity. The measure we describe below 
uses information on blocking claims to identify technology areas with thickets more precisely. 
3.2.1 Capturing hold-up potential
Building on the work cited above, Ziedonis (2004) introduced the first measure of hold-up 
potential into the literature. This measure uses citations from a focal firm’s patents to prior art 
owned by other firms. It then measures the ownership fragmentation (which is the opposite of 
concentration) of these citations to prior art. The more rival firms are cited by the focal firm, the 
higher the degree of fragmentation. Ziedonis (2004) argues that as a firm faces a more 
fragmented set of prior art the firm must build a larger portfolio of patents in order to insure itself 
against hold-up. The logic here is that of an arms race and it is invoked frequently by patent 
counsel of large firms in the semiconductor and information technology industries (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001; Federal Trade Commission, 2003; Somaya et al., 2007). Her study shows that 
the degree of fragmentation of prior art has a significant positive effect on the patenting efforts 
of capital intensive semiconductor firms. 
The Ziedonis measure has subsequently been used in a number of other studies of patent 
thickets (Noel and Schankerman, 2013; Graevenitz et al., 2012; Galasso and Schankerman, 
2010). While it captures hold-up potential in the sense that the firm faces many rival firms with 
similar technological competencies, it does not identify the ‘web of overlapping patent rights’. 
As we have noted above patent thickets affect firms’ costs in several ways and hold-up may not 
be the most significant of these in all jurisdictions. Where hold-up is less important as an 
immediate threat based on injunctions, the costs of disentangling overlapping property rights 
may still be significant. Thus an identification of the web of overlapping patent rights as a web 
or network is useful. 
3.2.2 A Measure derived from Social Network Analysis
If patent thickets are “dense webs of overlapping patent rights”, the extent of thickets can be 
measured by the overlap in patents in a technology. This leads us to consider measures of 
patent thickets derived from the methods of social network analysis (Watts, 2004; Jackson, 
2008; Borgatti et al., 2009). Here the patent thicket is conceived of as a network of firms. Within 
this network the firms are the nodes and the edges represent the degree of overlap between 
two firms’ patent portfolios. In this section we discuss various attempts to implement measures 
of patent thickets derived from network analytic methods. 
Clarkson (2005) and Clarkson and De Korte (2006) discuss the use of density measures as 
applied to citations of prior art on each patent to identify patent thickets. The density measure 
used is derived from the field of social network analysis (Watts, 2004; Jackson, 2008). Two 
problems arise with this method: first, it is carried out at the level of the patent while the strategic 
actor in the thicket is the firm and second, it is based on citations that do not necessarily 
indicate that the owner of the cited patent is in a position to limit the use of the citing patent. 
Sternitzke et al. (2008) further pursue the idea of network analysis on patent data using patent 
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families rather than individual patents aggregated up to the applicant level. While they discuss 
the concept of patent thickets as indicated by density of the network, they do not discuss a 
precise method for identifying them.
Building on the idea of overlapping patent rights Graevenitz et al. (2012; 2011) define a measure 
of patent thickets by focusing on the critical references to older patents (prior art) inserted in 
patent applications. Building on the EPO’s classification of citations on patent documents (Webb 
et al., 2005) they identify critical references – also known as X and Y citations - that indicate that 
the cited firm’s patent application contains prior art which limits one or more claims in the citing 
patent application. This type of citation indicates that at the application stage there is overlap 
between the patent claims of two firms. Graevenitz et al. (2012; 2011) then define a patent 
thicket as a network of links based on critical references between firms’ patent portfolios. Most 
likely, the patent thicket as defined by Shapiro (2000) is more extensive than that defined by 
these links. Nonetheless, we expect that both thickets overlap substantially. 
Graevenitz et al. (2012; 2011) introduce the concept of firm triples to identify patent thickets. A 
triple is defined as a group of three firms in which each firm has critical prior art limiting claims 
on recent patent applications of each of the other two firms. Clearly such a group of firms is 
caught in the most basic type of a patent thicket created by potentially overlapping patent 
portfolios. While two firms holding mutually limiting or blocking patents may resolve the threat of 
hold-up by contract, this is no longer as simple for firms in a triple. Here the relative value of any 
two firms’ patents depends on the actions of a third firm, making bargaining more difficult. 
Where multiple triples arise within the same network of firms it is highly likely that these will 
overlap creating ever more complex bargaining problems that require recourse to patent pools 
or standards for their resolution. 
It might be argued that the EPO identifies critical references in order to allow examiners to 
redraw claims in a patent document so as to reduce or eliminate the overlap that is identified. If 
this were completely successful the triples measure would not correlate with real patent thickets 
or any of their effects. This view is to place extreme faith in the ability of the EPO to remedy 
overlapping claims. In our view the EPO is unlikely to identify all potentially overlapping claims 
nor are examiners likely to remove all threats arising from them. This becomes apparent in 
studies showing that critical references are highly significant predictors of post grant opposition 
at EPO (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). Thus the triples measure identifies groups of firms who are 
likely bound together by further overlapping patents covering similar technologies used by them.
Graevenitz et al. (2011) show that counts of triples by technical area are significantly higher for 
technologies classified as complex than for areas classified as discrete by Cohen et al. (2000). 
More interestingly Graevenitz et al. (2012) provide a model of patenting efforts in complex and 
discrete technologies that provides counter-intuitive predictions for effects of technological 
opportunity on patenting in complex technologies. They show that their predictions are 
supported empirically, when they use the triples measure as a proxy for complexity of 
technologies. Also, Harhoff et al. (2012) show that post-grant opposition is affected by patent 
thickets in ways predicted by Farrell and Merges (2004). This study shows that patent applications 
of firms in the midst of patent thickets are less likely to be opposed than applications of firms on 
the fringes of thickets. This finding is hard to rationalize in the absence of patent thickets. In 
sum, these studies, which all compare patenting behavior across technology areas and time, 
indicate that the measure successfully proxies changes in the density of thickets. 
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Graevenitz et al. (2011) also point out that the concept of a triple is the same as a fully transitive 
triad. Triads were first identified by Holland and Leinhardt (Holland and Leinhardt, 1976), as local 
structures that characterize the global characteristics of a network. More recently, Milo et al. 
(2002; 2004b) provide comparisons of the information contained in different components of the 
triad census for different types of networks. They show that the citation networks between 
websites on the World Wide Web and several social networks can be best characterized using 
the fully transitive triad (or triple).
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4. Effects of Patent Thickets 
on Entry and Survival 
In this section we use the triples measure described above to provide descriptive analysis of 
patent thickets in European patent data and we describe the exposure of UK SMEs to these 
thickets. We then examine the possible impact of the presence of patent thickets on SMEs in 
the UK by looking at the probability of entry into patenting in a particular technology sector as a 
function of EPO patent application thickets in that sector. 
4.1 A descriptive analysis of patent thickets 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of patent application thickets in the patent system 
of the European Patent Office (EPO) using the triples measure of patent thicket density introduced 
in Section 3.2.2. In Appendix 7.1 we provide a validation analysis of this measure. It shows that 
the triples measure is a statistically highly significant measure of network structure, just as in the 
examples analyzed by (Milo et al., 2004b).
4.1.1 Descriptive analysis of triples counts
Table 4.1 sets out descriptive statistics for the triples measure by technology area. In Figure 2 
below we segment patent applications at the EPO into five main technology areas based on the 
2008 version of the ISI-OST-INPI technology classification (Schmoch, 2009). We then plot the 
number of triples for each of these technology areas between 1978 and 2005. 





1 Electronics / energy 2,472 181 208 1 245
2 Audiovisual 6,561 423 466 3 682
3 Telecom 15,815 1161 1165 2 1860
4 Digital communication 4,035 397 426 1 525
5 Basic Comm. processes 455 44 38 1 90
6 Computer technology 7,818 625 703 3 908
7 IT Methods 10 2 2 1 3
8 Semiconductors 4,423 335 374 1 559
9 Optics 3,000 197 255 1 277
10 Measurement 373 35 36 1 60
11 Control 66 8 6 1 15
12 Medical technology 711 53 58 3 78
13 Organic chemistry 1,618 104 91 2 181
14 Biotechnology 185 50 55 1 77
15 Pharmaceuticals 316 40 30 1 73
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16 Polymers 891 44 36 1 86
17 Food chemistry 17 2 2 1 3
18 Materials chemistry 604 30 29 1 53
19 Materials / metals 94 8 8 1 14
20 Surface technology 32 3 3 1 4
21 Chemical engineering 46 5 5 1 7
22 Environmental technology 76 10 7 1 22
23 Handling 96 9 10 1 14
24 Machinetools 104 14 17 1 20
25 Engines/pumps/turbines 2,212 203 225 1 305
26 Textiles/paper machines 672 57 53 1 99
27 Other machines 37 6 4 1 11
28 Thermal processes 51 6 6 1 9
29 Mechanical elements 244 28 27 1 43
30 Transport 2,770 295 314 1 441
31 Furniture/games 21 3 3 1 6
32 Other consumer goods 114 20 18 1 30
33 Civil engineering 90 9 9 1 16
  Total 56,029 567 441 1 1860
[Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics on Triples by Technology Area 1981-2009]
Figure 2 below clearly shows that the count of triples in Electrical Engineering far outstrips the 
counts of triples in any of the other main technology areas. This is commensurate with the 
earlier finding of Hall (2005) that the increase in patent applications at USPTO after 1984 was 
primarily due to firms operating in Information and Communications Technologies (ICT). At the 
EPO these firms patent primarily in the main technology area of Electrical Engineering. 
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Priority Year
Electrical Eng. Instruments Chemistry
Mechanical Eng. Civil Eng. & Others
by Main Area and Priority Year
Count of Triples 
Count of triples by main technology area and priority year
In an earlier version of this graph Graevenitz et al. (2012) show that the increases in triples are 
not affected by differential rates of patenting in the five main technology areas. We have checked 
that this also remains true when normalizing by the total weighted patent applications at EPO 
- compare Table 4.2 below.
The ISI-OST-INPI technology classification (Schmoch, 2009) also allows us to further segment 
each main technology area into constituent technology areas. Below we document the evolution 
of the number of triples in three main technology areas by technology area, these are: Electrical 
Engineering (Figure 3), Instruments (Figure 4) and Chemistry (Figure 5)
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Count of triples in scientific instruments by technology area and priority year
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Count of triples in chemistry by technology area and priority year
These three figures largely confirm what Figure 2 already indicated. The increases in triples 
counts are very high in almost all technology areas within the main area Electrical Engineering, 
while they are significantly lower in almost all technology areas within the main areas Instruments 
and Chemistry. 
Some noteworthy detail emerges, however:
• In Electrical Engineering triple counts are particularly high in the areas of 
Telecommunications, Audiovisual Technology, and Computer Technology. 
• In Instruments there is a five-fold increase in the level of the triples count between 1995 
and 2000 in Optics. We found that the initial growth in triples was driven mainly by 
patenting of the following firms: Canon, Matsushita, Seiko, and Epson. Subsequently the 
high level of triples is due to Sony, Ricoh and Samsung. 
• In  Chemistry we would not expect patent thickets to play a major role, with the possible 
exception of Biotechnology where it has been repeatedly argued that they may exist. 
Figure 5 indicates that if at all a patent thicket may be growing in the area of Organic 
Chemistry where triples counts doubled between 2000 and 2005. 
While these figures provide an indication of how dense patent thickets are in different technology 
areas, they do not show the structure of thickets and the firms involved in it. Figure 6 below 
shows the network of critical references, which contributed to one or more triples, in the 
technology area Telecommunications in the year 2005. The nodes in this figure represent 
individual firms. The size of the node represents the number of limiting citations to the firm’s prior 
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art. This can be interpreted as the importance of the firm’s patents for the commercialization of 
telecommunications technology by rival firms. The position of individual nodes is random. Most 
of the firms in Figure 6 that own many limiting patents are also frequently involved in patent 
litigation.27 This is an additional indication that the measure of thicket density based on critical 
references is a helpful way of capturing patent thickets.28
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Network of critical references in telecommunications in 2005
27 A discussion of patent litigation maps related to smartphones can be found here: http://www.techdirt.com/blog/
wireless/articles/20101007/22591311328/meet-the-patent-thicket-who-s-suing-who-for-smartphone-patents.
shtml .
28 It is possible to create multiple snapshots of a figure like Figure 6 below to show the evolving nature of the patent 
thicket in Telecommunications. However, we prefer to depict the evolution of the thickets using time series of the 
triples counts as set out in Figures 2-5 above as a series of figures such as figure 6 below contain too much 
information to be easily analyzed.
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4.2 Exposure of UK SMEs to patent thickets at 
the EPO 
In this section we set out a descriptive analysis of the technology areas and industry sectors that 
UK firms are active in. The graphs set out below show that UK firms tend not to enter those 
technology areas that are most heavily affected by patent thickets. 
The first three figures below (Figures 7-9) describe which proportion of entrants in a given cohort 
chose to enter a given technology area. We highlight those five technology areas, which are 
chosen most frequently in each cohort. The histograms reveal that Civil Engineering has 
persistently attracted the highest proportion of new patenting entrants out of each cohort. Within 
the technology areas most affected by patent thickets, those in the main area Electrical 
Engineering, we find that the proportion of UK firms entering Electricity/Energy, Computer 
Technology and Measurement is persistently at or close to 0.05% of each cohort. The histograms 
do not reveal strong visual evidence that the growth of patent thickets in some technology areas 
is having strong effects on the proportion of entrants choosing those technology areas.  
Proportion of firms that enter a technology area in 200229
29 34-class tech classification, in bold face the five classes highlighted above which attract the highest share of entry: 
101 Electricity/Energy, 102 Audiovisual Technology, 103 Telecoms, 104 Digital Communication, 105 Basic 
Communications Processes, 106 Computer Technology, 107 IT Methods, 108 Semiconductors, 109 Optics, 110 
Measurement, 111 Analysis Bio Materials, 112 Control, 113 Medical Technology, 114 Organic Chem, 115 
Biotechnology, 116 Pharmaceuticals, 117 Polymers, 118 Food Chemistry, 119 Materials Chemistry, 120 Materials/
Metallurgy, 121 Surface Technology, 122 Chem Engineering, 123 Environmental Technology, 124 Handling, 125 
Machine Tools, 126 Engines/Pumps/Turbines, 127 Textiles/Paper Machines, 128 Other Machines, 129 Thermal 
Processes, 130 Mechanical Elements, 131 Transport, 132 Furniture/Games, 133 Other Consumer Goods, 134 
Civil Engineering.
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Proportion of firms that enter a technology area in 2005
Proportion of firms that enter a technology area in 2008
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Figures 10-12 provide a descriptive breakdown of entry by market sector in which firms are 
active. We assign each firm to a principal sector on the basis of information contained in a 
number of waves of the FAME data sets. These figures show that the business sectors giving 
rise to new entry into patenting most frequently change much less over time than the technology 
areas shown in Figure 7-9. Most entrants are active in Business Services, R&D services or 
Wholesale Trade. 
Proportion of firms that enter a sector in 2002.30
[
30 1 Basic metals, 2 Chemicals, 3 Electrical machinery, 4 Electronics & instruments, 5 Fabricated metals, 6 Food, 
beverage, & tobacco, 7 Machinery, 8 Mining, oil&gas, 9 Motor vehicles, 10 Other manufacturing, 11 
Pharmaceuticals, 12 Rubber & plastics, 13 Construction, 14 Other transport, 15 Repairs & retail trade, 16 
Telecommunications, 17 Transportation, 18 Utilities, 19 Wholesale trade, 20 Business services, 21 Computer 
services, 22 Financial services, 23 Medical services, 24 Personal services, 25 Publishing, 26 R&D services.
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Proportion of firms that enter a sector in 2005
Proportion of firms that enter a sector in 2008
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Combining this finding with the clear variability in the proportion of entrants choosing specific 
technology areas, we see that UK firms active in specific product markets change the type of 
technology area they enter over time. Whether this is in response to growing patent thickets 
cannot be determined from the descriptive analysis. The econometric results provided in the 
following section show this to be the case.
4.3 Patent thickets and entry
As we discuss earlier in this report, one of the functions of the patent system is to allow inventors 
to exclude others from practicing their invention. The implication of this fact is that in technology 
areas where there are large numbers of patents, it might be more difficult for new firms to enter 
because the technology space is effectively covered by patents held by existing firms. By itself, 
this is not necessarily a phenomenon requiring some kind of policy intervention, as it is to be 
expected if the patent system is doing its job. However, in sectors where firms must draw on 
technologies for which their competitors hold patents in order to produce, it is possible that the 
presence of many closely related patents held by incumbent firms could discourage the entry of 
new firms with novel ideas, because such entry requires negotiating access to a prohibitively 
large number of other technologies in order to incorporate their invention(s) in a product. As we 
review earlier in this report, many researchers have identified sectors based on complex 
technologies and technical standards as sectors of this kind (Shapiro, 2000; Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001; Arora et al., 2008).
In order to capture the idea that some sectors may be characterized by collections of patents 
held by different firms, but at least some of which are jointly required for production, we use the 
previously described measure of patent thickets developed by Graevenitz et al. (2012, 2011), 
henceforth vGWH. The idea of this measure, which is based on patent applications to the EPO, 
is that it can proxy for the extent to which a sector contains many patents with possibly 
overlapping claims. Because it identifies situations where groups of firms are applying for similar 
patents that potentially block each other, it identifies technology areas where there is active 
patenting by existing firms that have strategic relationships with one another. As argued earlier, 
such technology areas are usually those where products are also complex and draw on 
technologies held by multiple firms. The inquiry we undertake here is whether UK firms are 
discouraged from entering such technology areas. Therefore we examine the influence of this 
measure on the probability that a UK firm enters a technology sector, where entry is defined as 
the priority year of the first patent in the relevant technology sector that is applied for at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) or the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO). The sample we use 
for estimation includes all the firms with at least one patent application at the IPO in the UK or 
the EPO during the 2001-2009 period, along with a random sample of non-patenting firms. 
The information for UK firms is drawn from the FAME database described in the appendix. 
Because this database includes all firms, it is very large, and includes mostly non-patenting 
firms. We do two things to deal with this problem: 1) we delete all firms in the industrial sectors 
that have little patenting (amounting to less than 2 per cent of all patenting); and 2) we choose 
a one per cent sample of non-patenting firms to compare to our patenting firms. 31 The latter 
31 Because each of the approximately 3 million firms can in prinicple generate 34 sectors*8 years = 272 observations, 
we are unable to include the full FAME dataset in our estimation. In practice, we found including the non-
patenters made little difference to our estimates. 
52 A Study of Patent Thickets
selection results in about equal numbers of patenting and non-patenting firms for estimation. In 
principle, this approach will result in an endogenous (choice-based) sample, but because we 
analyze at the firm-34 technology class level rather than at the firm level, we do not expect this 
to introduce a large amount of bias to the estimates. In addition, we delete all firms for which we 
have no size measure (the assets variable is missing).32 The resulting sample is the set of FAME 
firms with non-missing assets in manufacturing, oil and gas extraction and quarrying, 
construction, utilities, trade, and selected business services including financial services.33
The technology sectors that we use are those defined by vGWH and based on the 2008 version 
of the ISI-OST-INPI technology classification (denoted TF34 classes). 
32 Earlier estimations included these firms along with a dummy for missing assets, and we found that the results 
were almost identical with and without the firms that were missing data. In the interests of computing time and 
space, we therefore removed them. 
33 The excluded sectors are agriculture, other mining, education services, and hotels and restaurants, accounting 
for less than 2 per cent of total patenting in the UK. 
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of EPO Triples per 
Technology categories
GB 




pats patents  triples@
1000 
patents
Elec. machinery, energy 1,741 1,251 2,992 6.5% 4.2% 54,560 1,590 29.1
Audiovisual technology 822 644 1,465 3.1% 2.2% 32,935 3,708 112.6
Telecommunications 1,425 1,434 2,859 5.3% 4.9% 58,402 10,176 174.2
Digital communication 696 816 1,512 2.6% 2.8% 34,759 3,129 90.0
Basic comm processes 347 159 506 1.3% 0.5% 9,709 149 15.3
Computer technology 1,916 1,560 3,476 7.1% 5.3% 58,231 5,251 90.2
IT methods for mgt 327 275 601 1.2% 0.9% 8,499 8 0.9
Semiconductors 316 313 629 1.2% 1.1% 23,555 2,485 105.5
Optics 472 574 1,046 1.8% 1.9% 27,504 1,818 66.1
Measurement 1,504 1,716 3,220 5.6% 5.8% 42,544 278 6.5
Analysis bio materials 175 506 681 0.6% 1.7% 10,815 0 0.0
Control 754 657 1,411 2.8% 2.2% 17,022 52 3.1
Medical technology 1,258 1,887 3,144 4.7% 6.4% 61,448 492 8.0
Organic fine chemistry 231 1,840 2,071 0.9% 6.2% 38,544 941 24.4
Biotechnology 242 1,076 1,317 0.9% 3.6% 29,926 27 0.9
Pharmaceuticals 357 2,241 2,598 1.3% 7.6% 48,661 100 2.1
Macromolecular chem 141 300 441 0.5% 1.0% 20,234 175 8.6
Food chemistry 125 520 645 0.5% 1.8% 9,248 9 1.0
Basic materials chemistry 372 1,174 1,546 1.4% 4.0% 26,212 260 9.9
Materials metallurgy 201 347 548 0.7% 1.2% 16,024 53 3.3
Surface tech coating 372 363 735 1.4% 1.2% 16,492 25 1.5
Chemical engineering 631 854 1,485 2.3% 2.9% 23,179 26 1.1
Environmental tech 384 449 833 1.4% 1.5% 12,054 42 3.5
Handling 1,245 984 2,229 4.6% 3.3% 29,114 56 1.9
Machine tools 508 402 909 1.9% 1.4% 23,146 95 4.1
Engines,pumps,turbine 1,021 1,149 2,170 3.8% 3.9% 31,491 1,673 53.1
Textile and paper mach 288 339 627 1.1% 1.1% 22,460 429 19.1
Other spec machines 892 722 1,614 3.3% 2.4% 28,581 27 0.9
Thermal process and app 501 305 806 1.9% 1.0% 14,664 47 3.2
Mechanical elements 1,437 988 2,424 5.3% 3.4% 31,590 220 7.0
Transport 1,289 1,111 2,400 4.8% 3.8% 47,497 2,381 50.1
Furniture, games 1,309 766 2,075 4.9% 2.6% 19,048 17 0.9
Other consumer goods 768 572 1,341 2.9% 1.9% 18,888 114 6.0
Civil engineering 2,864 1,191 4,055 10.6% 4.0% 27,954 68 2.4
Total 26,927 29,483 56,409     974,988 35,921 36.8
Electrical engineering 7,589 6,451 14,040 28.2% 21.9% 280,648 26,496 94.4
Instruments 4,162 5,339 9,502 15.5% 18.1% 159,332 2,640 16.6
Chemistry 3,055 9,164 12,219 11.3% 31.1% 240,574 1,658 6.9
Mechanical engineering 7,179 6,000 13,179 26.7% 20.4% 228,543 4,928 21.6
Other Fields 4,942 2,529 7,470 18.4% 8.6% 65,891 199 3.0
* Weighting by owners is innocuous, since they all get added back into the same class cell.  
Weighting by classes means that a patent in multiple TF34 sectors is downweighted in each of the sectors. 
@ Triples based on all EPO patenting, priority years 2002-2009 (see text for definition and further explanation).
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The list is shown in Table 4.2, along with the number of EPO and UKIPO patents applied for by 
UK firms in the Fame database with priority dates between 2002 and 2009. A comparison of the 
frequency distribution across the technology classes in the two patent offices clearly shows that 
firms prefer to apply for chemical patents at the EPO whereas in other technologies they slightly 
prefer to apply at the UKIPO. 
A complication is that each firm can enter into any one of the 34 technology sectors, and many 
of the firms enter more than one, as one might have expected. More than half the firms patent 
in more than one sector, and 10 per cent patent in more than four. Our solution to this problem 
is to treat each entry possibility separately for each firm. That is, we have about 29,000 firms, 
each of which can potentially enter into each one of the 34 technology sectors, yielding about 
one million observations at risk. We cluster the standard errors by firm, so the model is effectively 
a firm random effects model for entry into the 34 sectors. 
In order to isolate the possible impact of triples on entry into patenting, it is important to control 
for other characteristics that affect the probability that a firm chooses to patent in a particular 
technology sector. First, it is well known that firm size and industry are important predictors of 
whether a firm patents at all (Bound et al. 1984 for US data). Hall et al. (2012) show this for UK 
patenting during the period studied here. In our entry regressions, we include the logarithm of 
the firm’s reported assets and a set of two-digit industry dummies to control for these 
characteristics.34 Second, we would expect that technology sectors with many triples are also 
sectors with many patents, and it is therefore more likely that a firm will patent in that sector, 
other things equal. To control for this effect, we include the logarithm of the aggregate EP patent 
applications in the technology sector during the year, and we normalize the count of triples by 
aggregate patenting in the same sector, so that the triples variable represents the intensity with 
which firms potentially hold blocking patents on each other relative to aggregate patenting 
activity in the technology. 
In the appendices, we describe in some detail the hazard models that we estimate (Section 7.3) 
and we show a number of exploratory regressions made using various models and specifications 
in the appendix tables 7.3 and 7.4. None of the choices made substantive differences to the 
effects of interest and in this part of the report we focus on the results from our preferred 
specification, the log-logistic accelerated failure time model, estimated with stratification by 
two-digit industry. The effect of the stratification is that we allow firms in each of the industries 
to have different means and standard deviations of the time until entry into patenting. That is, 
each industry has its own “failure” time distribution, where failure is defined as entry into patenting 
in a technology area, but this distribution is also modified by the firm’s size, aggregate patenting 
in the technology, and the triples density. 
Our estimation sample has about 29 thousand firms and one million firm-TF34 sector 
combinations. During the 2002-2009 period there are 12,991 entries into patenting for the first 
time in a technology sector by these firms. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the number of 
entries per firm: 3,507 enter one class, and the remainder enter more than one. Table 7.2 shows 
the FAME population of UK firms in our industries, together with the shares in each industry that 
have applied for a UK or EP patent during the 2001-2009 period. These shares range from over 
34 The choice of assets as a size measure reflects the fact that it is the only size variable available for the majority of 
the firms in the FAME dataset. 
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10 per cent in pharmaceuticals and R&D services to less than 0.1 per cent in construction, oil 
and gas services, real estate, law, and accounting. 
Our estimates of the model for entry into patenting are shown in Table 4.3 below. The first 
column is for estimates that have not been corrected for the fact that we sampled non-patenting 
firms rather than including the entire population, and the next two columns are weighted 
estimates that do adjust for the sampling strategy. Correcting for sampling made little difference 
to the coefficients of interest, although it reduces the firm size coefficient quite a bit, because 
non-patenters tend to be smaller firms.35 The coefficient estimates shown are elasticities of the 
probability that a firm will enter into patenting in a particular technology in response to a change 
in the variable. 
  Accelerated failure time - Log Logistic
Variable Unweighted Weighted by sampling probability
Log (triples density in class) -0.121*** -0.123*** -0.128***
         (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Log (patents in class) 0.678*** 0.696*** 0.738***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Log assets 0.156*** 0.048*** 0.052***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log (triples density) 0.004**
         * Log assets (0.002)
Log (patents) -0.032***
        * Log assets (0.007)
Industry dummies stratified# stratified# stratified#
Year dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -59,813.9 -51,369.1 -51,357.8
Degrees of freedom 35 35 37
Chi-squared 2178.2 1982.1 1992.5
Coefficients for the hazard of entry into a patenting class are shown. 
Standard errors are clustered on firm. *** (**) denote significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
998,219 firm-TF34 observations with 12,991 entries (29,435 firms) 
Time period is 2002-2009. Sample is all UK firms with nonmissing assets 
# Estimates are stratified by industry - each industry has its own baseline hazard. [
Focusing on our variables of interest and on the weighted estimates, we see that aggregate 
patenting in a technology class is a strong predictor of whether a firm enters that class. A 
doubling of patenting is associated with a 70 per cent higher probability of entry (standard error 
2.0%). However, when we include the triples density in the class, we find that it depresses entry. 
Doubling the intensity of triples in a class is associated with a highly significant 12 per cent lower 
hazard of entry into that class (standard error 0.7%). 
35  The sampling weights effectively downweight the non-patenters, so the fact that they are smaller has less impact 
on the prediction. 
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In the last column we interact the log of assets with the log of patents and the log of triples 
density to see whether these effects vary by size.36 They do, and in the expected way. The 
impact on larger firms from aggregate patenting weakens and the impact of triples strengthens 
slightly. That is, the impact of both aggregate patenting (positive) and triples density (negative) 
on SMEs is stronger than it is for larger firms. We show this graphically in Figure 13, which 
overlays the coefficients of aggregate patenting and triples density as a function of firm size on 
the actual size distribution of our firms. From the graph one can see that the impact of aggregate 
patenting in a sector is higher and more variable than the impact of the triples density. Firms in 
the lower range of the size distribution (assets less than 10,000 pounds) are much more likely 
to enter a sector with high aggregate patenting if they enter at all, but their hazard of entry falls 
15 per cent if the triples density doubles in that sector. On the other hand, for the few firms in 
the upper range of the size distribution (assets greater than 100 billion pounds), the hazard of 
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Estimated coefficients as a function of firm size
We also simulated the effect of reducing the log of the triples density by one standard deviation. 
Because the triples density has a wide range (0.0002 to 0.2407), a one standard deviation 
reduction in the log is quite large and corresponds to reduction the density fivefold). Figure 13 
shows the corresponding increase in entry hazard by technology class. It is clear that entry into 
patenting increases greatly in those technologies where there are a large number of triples per 
patent: Telecommunications, Computer technology, Audio-visual technology, Digital 
communications, Semiconductors, etc. 
36 Note that all the variables have been centered at their means, so that the coefficients on the non-interacted 
variables are coefficients at the mean of the data and can be compared across the columns directly. 
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5 Conclusion
Patent thickets are defined by a number of observers as a dense web of patents with overlapping 
claims that are held by several (competing) companies. As discussed in our report, such thickets 
can arise for a multitude of reasons; they are mainly driven by an increase in the number of 
patent filings (and its consequences for patent quality) as well as increased technological 
complexity and interdependence. This report has investigated the effect of patent thickets on 
firm behavior. Specifically, we analysed whether patent thickets represent a barrier to entry into 
particular technologies for UK SMEs.
Our report reveals a lack of prior empirical evidence on the effect of thickets on firm behavior, 
both in terms of performance and innovative activity. Nevertheless, we show that there is a 
substantial body of research investigating the factors that lead to the emergence and growth of 
thickets. The literature review offered in this report also highlights the concentration of this 
evidence on US data. There is also an active, more recent, literature on the empirical measurement 
of patenting in complex technologies and the resulting thickets that focuses mainly on EPO 
data. Both literatures provide a considerable amount of empirical evidence for the existence and 
growth of patent thickets, especially in ICT-related technologies.
To analyse the possible impact of thickets on UK firms, we measure entry as a firm’s decision to 
patent for the first time in a given technology area rather than entry into product markets. This 
choice is partly driven by the lack of precise data on entry into product markets, but can be 
defended by the argument that competition in patent-intensive sectors will per force require 
some effort to patent in the relevant sector. Our report reviews empirical evidence that associates 
improved economic performance at the firm-level, both in terms of growth and the number of 
new products marketed, with first-time patenting. This implies that analysing whether thickets 
affect firms’ propensity to file a patent for the first time in a given technology may have direct 
implications for firm performance, both in terms of growth and innovation. Focusing on entry 
into patenting also has the advantage of providing us with the complete set of potential entrants, 
i.e., any registered firm in our database that has not previously patented. If instead we had 
studied entry into the product market, potential entrants would have become observable only 
after entry into the market. The absence of information on those firms that chose not to enter 
would complicate our analysis considerably.
In our context, patent thickets can represent a barrier to entry if potential social benefits of the 
factors that give rise to thickets do not outweigh the social costs induced by lower entry rates 
than in the absence of thickets. Obviously, this is hard to measure in practice. However, our 
review of the literature on thickets has revealed few reasons to believe that thickets are 
associated with factors that have raised social welfare and many that indicate that thickets are 
creating important welfare losses. As noted above, there is so far very little evidence on the 
effects patent thickets have on firm entry. Therefore, we resort to assessing directly the impact 
of thickets on the propensity to enter a given technology. 
Using the triples measure our descriptive evidence shows strong increases in the density of 
thickets in almost all technologies related to Electrical Engineering, especially in 
Telecommunication, Audiovisual- and Computer-technology. Our data show that patent thickets 
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are significantly less dense in all other technology areas, although we also find some evidence 
of an increase in the area of Optical instruments. 
Using duration regression analysis, we study the probability of entry into patenting in a particular 
technology sector as a function of patent thickets in that sector, conditional on aggregate 
patenting in that technology. Our results suggest a substantial and statistically significant 
negative association between the density of thickets and the propensity to patent for the first 
time in a given technology area. 
As we find thickets to affect entry negatively, there is a strong indication that thickets represent 
some kind of barrier to entry in those technology areas in which they are present. However, we 
must emphasize that the simple finding of a barrier to entry created by patent thickets is not 
proof positive that reducing that barrier and increasing entry would lead to welfare improvements 
in the innovation/competition space.  Rather it is the existence of evidence that the presence of 
thickets reduces entry combined with the large literature we have reviewed that shows that 
currently patent systems do not work as well as they should. This literature documents quality 
issues with patents in technology areas affected by patent thickets, a large decline in the 
relationship between R&D spending and patenting in some sectors and a substantial increase 
in resources devoted to patent litigation leading to the partial or complete revocation of patents 
in areas identified as prone to thickets. All of this may lead one to the conclusion that the 
operation of the patent system could use some improvement. 
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7. Appendix
7.1 Description of Datasets Created
The report relies on an updated version of the Oxford-Firm-Level-Database, which combines 
information on patents (UK and EPO) with firm-level information obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database (for more details see Helmers et al. (2011) from 
which the data description in this section draws).
The integrated database consists of two components: a firm-level data set and IP data. The 
firm-level data is the FAME database that covers the entire population of registered UK firms.37 
In FAME, ‘firms’ represent registered firms, i.e., the legal entity that organizes production 
(administrative unit), in contrast to census-type data that often uses the plant or production unit. 
This unit of analysis corresponds to the enterprise in the BSD. In contrast to ONS data, FAME 
is a commercial database provided by Bureau van Dijk. The advantage of using FAME over ONS 
data is that it is freely accessible under a licensing agreement and that firms can be identified by 
name. 
The original version of the database, which formed the basis for the update carried out by the 
UKIPO, relied on two versions of the FAME database: FAME October 2005 and March 2009. 
The main motivation for using two different versions of FAME is that FAME keeps details of 
`inactive’ firms (see below) for a period of four years. If only the 2009 version of FAME were 
used, intellectual property could not be allocated to any firm that has exited the market before 
2005, which would bias the matching results. FAME is available since 2000, which defines the 
earliest year for which the integrated data set can consistently be constructed. The update 
undertaken by the UKIPO used the April 2011 version of FAME. However, since there are 
significant reporting delays by companies, even using the FAME 2011 version means that the 
latest year for which firm-level data can be used reliably is 2009.
FAME contains basic information on all firms, such as name, registered address, firm type, 
industry code, as well as entry and exit dates. Availability of financial information varies 
substantially across firms. In the UK, the smallest firms are legally required to report only very 
basic balance sheet information (shareholders’ funds and total assets). The largest firms provide 
a much broader range of profit and loss information, as well as detailed balance sheet data 
including overseas turnover. This is why our study focuses on total assets as a measure of firm 
size and growth. 
The patent data come from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). Data on 
UK and EPO patent publications by British entities were downloaded from PATSTAT version 
April 2010 and April 2011. Due to the average 18 months delay between the filing and publication 
date of a patent, using the April 2011 version means that the patent data are presumably only 
complete up to the third quarter in 2009. This effectively means that we can use the patent data 
only up to 2009 under the caveat that it might be somewhat incomplete for 2009. Patent data 
are allocated to firms in the year in which a firm applied for the registration of the corresponding 
intellectual property.
37  FAME downloads data from Companies House records where all limited companies in the UK are registered.
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Since patent records do not include the registered number of a company even if the applicant 
is a registered business, it is not possible to merge data sets using a unique firm identifier; 
instead, applicant names in the IP documents and firm names in FAME have to be matched. 
Both a firm’s current and previous name(s), were used for matching in order to account for 
changes in firm names. Matching on the basis of company names requires names in both data 
sets to be `standardized’ prior to the matching process in order to ensure that small (but often 
systematic) differences in the way names are recorded in the two data sets do not impede the 
correct matching. For more details on the matching see Helmers et al. (2011).
7.2 Methodological analysis of the triples 
measure
This appendix contains results of a statistical test of the triples measure similar to that provided 
by Milo et al. (2002; 2004a) . As discussed in Section 3.2.2 above counts of triples have been 
shown to be statistically significant measure of the structure of networks in a number of contexts 
such as the World Wide Web. To date such an analysis has not been performed in the context 
of patent data. The aim of the analysis is to determine whether triples or any other network motif 
are likely to arise with such frequency randomly that their occurrence in the real data we analyze 
cannot be interpreted as a signal of any kind of real structure.
We use the FANMOD software developed by Wernicke and Rasche (2006) to count and test the 
significance of various network motifs. The test of the significance of these motifs is undertaken 
by comparing the frequency of occurrence of a given motif in the data obtained from the EPO 
with the occurrence of the motif in 1000 comparison datasets obtained by perturbing the original 
data randomly. We set the parameters of the software such that the randomly created 
comparison data preserve the characteristics of the original data as closely as possible.
To perform this test we segmented patent applications at the EPO into 34 technology areas 
based on the 2008 version of the ISI-OST-INPI technology classification (Schmoch, 2009). We 
then used data on critical references in three of these areas (Telecommunications, Optics and 
Medical Technology) for the periods 1997-1999 and 2003-2005 to analyze the significance of 
different network motifs as measures that could characterize the structure of the underlying 
data. We chose these three technology areas because it is well known that Telecommunications 
is affected by a patent thicket, while we expect Optics and Medical Technology to be much less 
affected. In the next subsection we show that Optics presents an intermediate case between 
Telecommunications and Medical Technology. 
Area Years Z-Score
Medical Technology 1997-99 115.6
Optics 1997-99 24.8
Telecommunications 1997-99 9.7
Medical Technology 2003-05 81.6
Optics 2003-05 39.2
Telecommunications 2003-05 9.0
[Table 7.1: Z-Scores for the Triples Measures in Selected Technology Areas]
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Table 7.1 above presents the Z-scores for this measure. 38 While there is a broad range in these 
values they are always so high that we can be sure that triples arise far more frequently in all of 
these data sets than we would expect if the triples just arose randomly. 
Following Milo et al. (2004b) we summarize our findings using significance profiles for each of 
these areas. A significance profile is the vector of Z scores normalized to length 1. This 
normalization allows us to view the relative importance of the Z-scores for different motifs 
abstracting from their absolute values which are affected by the number of observations in the 
six different data-sets we analyze.
Figure 15 below presents the six triad significance profiles based on the Z-scores we extracted 
from our data using FANMOD for each of the three technology areas in each of . The figure 
contains 9 of the 13 network motifs presented by Milo et al. (2004b). The remainder did not 
arise in our data or were not significant. A comparison with the significance profiles presented 
in Figure 1 of their paper for the World Wide Web and social networks reveals that the shape of 
our significance profiles for the network motifs 7-13 is quite similar. There are clear peaks for the 
motifs 9, 10 and 13 and similarly minima and 8 and 11. It is noticeable that in Telecommunications 
and Optics where patent thickets are present there is a significant minimum for the network 
motif 12 while this is not the case for the networks analyzed by Milo et al. (2004b). Network 
motif 12 is one in which one firm has mutually limiting patents with both other firms, whilst only 
one of these two is limiting the other. The fact that this motif is not present with significant 
frequency might be evidence for strategic patenting by firms caught in patent thickets. More 
study on this point is required before we may be sure however.
Triad Significance Profiles for Selected Technology Areas and Years 
38  A measure of statistical significance indicating how many standard deviations the real triples count is higher than 
that of the mean of the simulated random samples.
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This section has demonstrated that the triples measure of patent thicket density is a statistically 
significant measure of the structure of networks constituted between firms’ patent portfolios by 
critical references. In the following section we will analyze the development of patent thickets 
using this measure.
7.3 Hazard models of entry
This section of the appendix describes the hazard or survival models that are used to estimate 
the probability of entry into a technology. These models express the probability that a firm enters 
into patenting in a certain sector conditional on not having entered yet as a function of the firm’s 
characteristics and the time since the firm was “at risk,” which is the time since the founding of 
the firm. Obviously in some cases, our data does not go back as far as the founding date of the 
firm, and in these cases the data are “left-censored.” When we do not observe the entry of the 
firm into a particular technology sector by the last year (2009), the data is referred to as “right-
censored.” 
We estimate two classes of “failure” or “survival” models: 1) proportional hazard, where the 
hazard of failure over time has the same shape for all firms, but the overall level is proportional 
to an index that depends on firm characteristics; and 2) accelerated failure time, where the 
hazard of entry (“failure”) is accelerated or decelerated by the characteristics of the firm.
The first model has the following form:
 
where i denotes a firm, j denotes a technology sector, and t denotes the time since entry into 
the sample. h(t) is the baseline hazard, which is either a non-parametric or a parametric function 
of time since entry into the sample. The impact of any characteristic x on the hazard can be 
computed as follows:
Thus if x is measured in logs, β measures the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to x. Note 
that this quantity does not depend on the baseline hazard h(t), but is the same for any t. We use 
two choices for h(t): the semi-parametric Cox estimate and the Weibull distribution ptp-1. By 
allowing the Cox h(t) or p to vary freely across industrial sector, we can allow the shape of the 
hazard function to be different for different industries while retaining the proportionality 
assumption. 
In order to allow even more flexibility across the different industrial sectors, we also use two 
accelerated failure time models, the log-normal model and the log-logistic model. These have 
the following basic form (see streg in the Stata Survival Analysis manual for details):
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where S(t) is the survival function and λi = exp(xiβ). We allow the parameters σ (log-normal) or 
γ(log-logistic) to vary freely across industries. That is, for these models, both the mean and the 
variance of the survival distribution are specific to the 2-digit industry. In the case of these two 
models, the elasticity of the hazard with respect to a characteristic x depends on time and on 
the industry-specific parameter (σ or γ), yielding a more flexible model. Note also that the hazard 
rate is given by –dlogS(t)/dt in general (Lancaster 1990). 
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7.4 Additional Tables














15 or more 4 75
Total 6,830 12,991
Table 7.1: Number of technology areas entered 2002-2009
 













Oil & gas extraction 06 57,686 48 0.08% 231
Quarrying 08 48,182 87 0.18% 126
Oil & gas services 09 84,619 115 0.14% 727
Food mfg 10 10,110 106 1.05% 444
Beverage mfg 11 1,881 24 1.28% 70
Tobacco 12 72 3 4.17% 29
Textiles 13 5,625 96 1.71% 313
Apparel 14 7,029 38 0.54% 96
Leather 15 1,234 11 0.89% 22
Wood 16 8,004 58 0.72% 150
Paper 17 3,170 110 3.47% 551
Printing 18 18,663 109 0.58% 590
Oil,coke refining 19 355 5 1.41% 59
Chemicals 20 5,032 333 6.62% 6274
Pharmacueticals 21 1,306 132 10.11% 2324
Rubber & plastics 22 7,658 497 6.49% 2096
Stone, Clay, & glass 23 5,100 134 2.63% 621
Basic metals 24 4,160 84 2.02% 428
Fabricated metals 25 33,321 857 2.57% 3608
Electronics & instruments 26 13,539 888 6.56% 6757
Electrical machinery 27 2,852 228 7.99% 1132
Machinery 28 12,026 718 5.97% 4930
Motor vehicles 29 2,942 139 4.72% 1419
Other transport 30 4,542 120 2.64% 1194
Furniture 31 6,324 73 1.15% 168
Other manufacturing 32 22,366 1,016 4.54% 5673
Repairs 33 5,911 174 2.94% 1704
Utilities 35 3,848 37 0.96% 121
Water distribution 36 1,003 29 2.89% 112
Sewers 37 861 8 0.93% 9
Recycling 38 6,001 37 0.62% 69
Construction 41 201,216 186 0.09% 855
Site preparation 42 6,223 28 0.45% 31
Construction trades 43 182,441 393 0.22% 1161
Auto trade 45 50,491 77 0.15% 378
Wholesale trade, except autos 46 134,296 996 0.74% 4486
Retail trade 47 152,133 252 0.17% 699













Land transport 49 53,264 57 0.11% 173
Water transport 50 3,838 8 0.21% 20
Air transport 51 3,533 8 0.23% 138
Cargo handling & travel agencies 52 17,576 37 0.21% 111
Post & telecomm 53 4,313 7 0.16% 53
Publishing 58 65,015 209 0.32% 608
Telecommunications 61 17,393 161 0.93% 2682
Computer consulting 62 191,290 996 0.52% 4367
Data processing, hosting 63 9,714 54 0.56% 77
Banks and other financial services 64 44,921 75 0.17% 131
Insurance 65 13,581 15 0.11% 50
Securities 66 11,461 21 0.18% 204
Real estate 68 130,182 84 0.06% 266
Law and accounting 69 49,404 27 0.05% 189
Management consulting 70 205,811 618 0.30% 4124
Engineering services 71 48,517 272 0.56% 1626
R&D services 72 10,291 1,168 11.35% 11214
Advertising 73 25,454 78 0.31% 250
Non-trading companies 74 20,529 304 1.48% 4727
Other business activities 82 625,553 2,066 0.33% 9898
Medical services 86 44,865 161 0.36% 923
Other personal services 96 123,321 428 0.35% 1385
Dormant 99 2,464 23 0.93% 1259
Unknown 428,208 0 0.00% 408
Total   3,262,720 15,123 0.46% 94,540
Table 7.2: FAME Population of UK firms, by industry 
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 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log (triples density  -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.112*** -0.119***
         in class) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Log (patents in class) 0.470*** 0.643*** 0.644*** 0.702*** 0.644*** 0.703***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022)
Log assets 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.075***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log (triples density) 0.005** 0.005**
    * Log assets (0.002) (0.002)
Log (patents) -0.037*** -0.038***
     * Log assets (0.006) (0.006)
Industry dummies no no yes yes stratified# stratified#
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood -145,999.7 -145,815.9 -145,773.0 -145,755.2 -108,086.4 -108,068.2
Degrees of freedom 9 10 34 36 10 12
Chi-squared 2293.4 2660.8 2746.7 2782.4 2676.4 2712.9
All estimates are weighted estimates, weighted by sampling probability. Coefficients shown are elasticities of the 
hazard w.r.t. the variable. 
*** (**) denote significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
Time period is 2002-2009. Sample is all UK firms with nonmissing assets 
998,219 firm-TF34 observations with 12,991 entries (29,435 firms) 
# Estimates are stratified by industry - each industry has its own baseline hazard
Table 7.3: Hazard of entry into patenting in a TF34 Class - Proportional Hazard (Cox) 
Model
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  Proportional hazard AFT
Variable Cox PH Weibull Log logistic
Log (triples density in class) -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.123***
         (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Log (patents in class) 0.644*** 0.645*** 0.696***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.020)
Log assets 0.070*** 0.045*** 0.048***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Industry dummies stratified# stratified# stratified#
Year dummies yes yes yes
Log likelihood -108,086.4 -51,393.4 -51,369.1
Degrees of freedom 10 35 35
Chi-squared 2676.4 2415.9 1982.1
All estimates are weighted estimates, weighted by sampling probability. Coefficients shown are elasticities of the 
hazard w.r.t. the variable. 
*** (**) denote significance at the 1% (5%) level. 
998,219 firm-TF34 observations with 12,991 entries (29,435 firms) 
Time period is 2002-2009. Sample is all UK firms with nonmissing assets 
AFT - Accelerated Failure Time models 
# Estimates are stratified by industry - each industry has its own baseline hazard. 
Table 7.4: Hazard of entry into patenting in a TF34 Class - Comparing models
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